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From the battlefield adjutants were continually galloping up to Napoleon with
reports from his marshals of the progress of the action. But all those reports were
deceptive; both because in the heat of battle it is impossible to say what is happen-
ing at any given moment, and because many of the adjutants never reached the
actual battlefield, but simply repeated what they heard from others, and also be-
cause, while the adjutant was galloping the two or three versts to Napoleon, cir-
cumstances had changed, and the news he brought had already become untrue….
Upon such inevitably misleading reports Napoleon based his instructions,
which had mostly been carried out before he made them, or else were never, and
could never, be carried out at all….
For the most part what happened was the opposite of what they commanded to
be done. The soldiers ordered to advance found themselves under grapeshot fire,
and ran back. The soldiers commanded to stand still in one place seeing the Rus-
sians appear suddenly before them, either ran away or rushed upon them; and the
cavalry unbidden galloped in after the flying Russians….
In reality all these movements forward and back again hardly improved or
affected the position of the troops.1
—Tolstoy, War and Peace, Chapter 33
Education reform has spawned efforts to test learning across the nation. This
paper analyzes the determinants of Massachusetts’ school district test scores
under the state’s high stakes testing program, MCAS. The study is the first to
demonstrate direct links between improvements in MCAS scores and state aid to
school districts. The authors estimate “value added” for each school district in
the state. The list of schools with high value added produces real surprises —
while some affluent districts do well, others rank at the very bottom. Addition-
ally, the study analyzes how teacher maximum salaries, district superintendent
salaries, per capita income, internet usage, and other factors, including various
state school “choice” initiatives, affect test scores. The study shows that athletic
budgets have substantial impacts on district test scores — the more districts
spend on athletics as a percentage of the state’s “foundation budget,” the lower
their scores.
    This is the first study to cover the entire state and employ appropriate spatial
statistics to correct well-known errors in statistical estimates of geographic data.
Jie Chen is Statistician, Computing Services, at University of Massachusetts Boston. Thomas
Ferguson, professor of political science at University of Massachusetts Boston, is a member of
the National Advisory Panel of the Quality Initiative of the Council for Aid to Education.
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In the shadow of 9/11, once fashionable allusions to America’s “great school wars”now sound unbearably glib. But as one contemplates the current political struggles
over the state’s high stakes testing program — the famous MCAS (Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System) — it is frequently hard not to recall Tolstoy’s
celebrated account of the Battle of Borodino. While average scores in most districts
are rising, a radical change in the scoring of the English test for 2001 clouds the real
extent of improvement. Nor, almost a decade after the landmark Massachusetts Edu-
cation Reform Act, has anyone succeeded in resolving the Commonwealth’s modern
Riddle of the Sphinx: whether there is any relation between the test score changes
and the state’s prodigious investments in K-12 education.2 So far, the boldest claim
is that increased state spending may have elevated fourth grade scores (only) in the
final years of MCAS’s low stakes predecessor, the Massachusetts Educational Assess-
ment Program (MEAP). Other researchers who have pored over data for MCAS
itself report mixed or negative findings and they counsel patience, until the passage
of time secures more data.
Analyzing Change
We will see below that the analysis of “change” is among the most treacherous areas
in all of statistics, one that has in recent years claimed the attentions of many gifted
researchers. Thus, even amid tightening state budgets, it is relatively easy to under-
stand why advice simply to let the taxi meter run has yet to inspire overt resistance.
But more than the big picture is obscure. Just as at Borodino, facts in the field are
murkier than almost anyone realizes: While test results for individual pupils are not,
of course, released publicly, the Department of Education (DOE) publishes scores
aggregated by school and district, which anyone can download from its website with
simple equipment. Yet early in our research, we were taken aback to discover that,
using this data, we could not replicate the scores reported in the major media, or the
rankings of school districts derived from them.
Several reviews of MCAS data have already been published, or at least discussed
in newspapers.3 Each makes useful points, but all are brief and consider only a hand-
ful of issues. The Department of Education’s “Technical Reports,” available on its
website, provide more extensive analysis, but are also narrowly focused. If the DOE
or the test maker has conducted longer studies, they have not been made public.4 In
the meantime, impressions persist that “demography is destiny” — that school char-
acteristics have little to do with test outcomes and that children in affluent school
districts can hardly help scoring well, simply because they come from affluent back-
grounds. Data indicating drastic ethnic and racial disparities in scores also fan anxi-
eties about possible discrimination. Many also claim that competition from new,
state-supported charter schools must inevitably spur public schools to higher stan-
dards of performance and perhaps even mitigate existing racial and ethnic dispari-
ties. And, of course, a large segment of popular opinion wonders if the tests reliably
measure anything at all, even as many homebuyers and not a few school boards,
superintendents, citizens, and real estate agents track year-to-year fluctuations in test
scores as though they were major league batting averages.5
Some of these views are rooted in demonstrable misunderstandings and do not
require extensive analysis. For example, opponents of high stakes testing perform a
valuable service when they remind everyone that individual test scores are often
highly inaccurate. But it simply does not follow that test results for large groups of
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students are nonsense. The decisive point is that some scores come in too high and
others, which tend, not surprisingly, to garner more publicity, come in too low. In
large groups, such cases normally wash out, making group averages far more accu-
rate than results for individuals.
A Study in Four Parts
But making real progress on other MCAS data fronts is not so easy. It requires a
lengthy review of the evidence, with more sophisticated statistical techniques than
have thus far been applied. This paper presents a detailed quantitative assessment of
many issues connected with the MCAS. In Part I, we begin by clarifying questions
about the data. We show that DOE data as used by major newspapers in the Com-
monwealth to identify best performing districts fail to do so, for uncontroversial
statistical reasons. We correct the error and produce (in Appendices 1 and 2) a list of
the best performing districts based on the same DOE data.
Part II of our paper analyzes the determinants of school district performance
under the MCAS. Changes in scoring initiated in 2001 do not prevent comparisons
with earlier years, but the switch does mean that without access to additional data,
the range of statistical techniques that can be employed is relatively meager. Our aim
in this paper is to dissect the state’s experience with MCAS in as much detail as
possible, so that we can shed light on the most urgent public policy questions the test
raises. Accordingly, we consider results for the test from the years 1998, 1999, and
2000, when scores are generally agreed to be directly comparable. Our consideration
of results for 2001 is brief, limited to Appendix 2’s district grand averages for refer-
ence purposes.
We begin by developing a “cross-sectional” model of district success. In this tra-
ditional approach time plays no essential role. The aim is to understand the determi-
nants of each school district’s consolidated grand average score over those three
years as a whole. Sorting through a wide range of specifications and potential influ-
ences, we try to pick our way through the statistical problem of multicollinearity, or
the fact that some variables that affect student performance are so closely associated
that they are all but impossible to distinguish. Eventually we arrive at a plausible,
statistically rigorous model of district performance.
We employ this model to assess a much broader range of potential influences on
school district tests than previous studies, including the salaries not only of teachers,
but of school superintendents, the influence of sports, curriculum (in certain limited
measures), district political competition, the availability of computers, and the allo-
cation of money across various budgetary categories, such as spending on teachers’
aides. We also inquire whether the many claims made about the salutary effects of
school “choice” and charter schools square with the facts of performance on the test
and whether district participation in the METCO program that buses children from
inner cities to suburban schools affects scores.
Part III of our paper attempts to demonstrate that MCAS can be employed to
assess “value added” and not simply to ratify claims of the state’s most affluent com-
munities to harbor the “best” schools in the state. We employ our model to identify
schools that consistently score above what their economics and demography predict.
The resulting roster of “best performing” districts is strikingly different from con-
ventional lists based simply on raw scores. It yields real surprises and cannot be
dismissed as a simple reflection of social circumstances. It also is proof against ob-
jections advanced by some members of the Massachusetts Department of Education
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that test scores from these early years cannot be used to rank districts because stu-
dents who were not required to pass the MCAS to obtain a diploma may not have
taken the test seriously enough.6
At last in Part IV, in almost Kirkegaardian fear and trembling, we tackle the
question of change — of what might be styled the “billion dollar question” of
whether the state really has anything substantial to show for all the money it has
lavished on K-12 education. To answer this query, we employ a relatively new sta-
tistical technique, the so-called “multi-level” or “growth curve” approach to analyz-
ing longitudinal data with repeated measures on the same subjects (here, school
districts). Our conclusions are necessarily shadowed by many qualifications that are
inherent in the analysis of educational outcomes over time. They can also easily be
overstated, since the effects in question (which are almost certainly still evolving)
appear thus far to be modest.
Methodology
Still, in the end, our results are fairly clear cut: While we detect signs of real ineffi-
ciencies in the system, we also find solid evidence that the increases in school dis-
trict MCAS scores are positively related to increased state funding for K-12 educa-
tion. Our results also contain surprising implications regarding racial and economic
disparities in the MCAS. We find, for example, that while the percentage of Afri-
can-Americans in a district influenced the district’s starting position in the MCAS
process, it appears to have no effect on subsequent rates of improvement. District
rates of improvement also appear to be independent of the presence of other minor-
ity groups and of current per capita income. But using recently released data from
the 2000 U.S. Census, we do find that rates of improvement on the test are related
to changes in district household income between 1989 and 1999.
 Our paper contrasts with previous studies in other ways besides the range of the
questions we address. For example, we are clear that MCAS data are spatial data.
That is, test scores are not simply numbers drawn from random samples, but come
from particular school districts located in definite places. Geographers have long
recognized that such data are highly likely to exhibit “spatial autocorrelation” — a
pattern in which areas physically adjacent to one another strongly resemble each
other. Such data cannot reliably be investigated with the customary statistical tech-
niques of “ordinary least squares” regression. They require special methods that are
all but unknown in educational statistics and not all that common even in economet-
rics.7 In this paper, we rely heavily on Geographic Information System (GIS) tech-
niques used to map data that is displayed spatially.8 These techniques calculate a
neighborhood matrix that specifies distances between districts to test for the presence
of spatial autocorrelation. Where this is present — as it is in virtually all our cross-
sectional results — we correct for it. But while the methods used in this paper are
admittedly complex, we relegate purely technical details to Appendices or notes. Our
main text is designed to be read by anyone concerned with the policy issues at stake
in the MCAS debate.
We try to improve on previous studies in a second, major way by recovering data
that they drop out. In Massachusetts most school districts represent towns. But a fair
number of smaller, sparsely populated municipalities share part of their school sys-
tems — normally the (relatively expensive) high school, and frequently part or all
of the middle school — with one or more neighbors. The shared part of the system
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normally constitutes a separate school “district” for reporting purposes. Thus towns
like Acton and Boxborough each run a K-6 local system while jointly administering
the overlapping Acton-Boxborough district from grade 7 on.
For statistical studies such arrangements create real headaches. The MCAS tests
we study in this paper were administered to students in grades 4, 8, and 10.9 Com-
paring grand averages of districts with and without high schools is like comparing
apples with oranges. Consequently, previous studies have simply dropped the incom-
plete districts.10 But throwing so much data out is dangerous. Also, the number of
districts that are usually excluded for this reason is not negligible — depending on
how one counts, they may amount to a quarter of the whole sample.11 When the size
of the sample is reduced, the reliability of results decreases, and the task of sorting
out the operative variables — the problem of statistical multicollinearity — becomes
all the more intractable. It is no way to investigate a process with such sweeping
implications for so many people.
We restore the data lost to previous studies by combining results for the compo-
nent districts. For example, in our dataset the lower grades in Acton and
Boxborough are combined with the joint Acton-Boxborough upper grades to create
one “Acton-Boxborough” district. Since the “units,” once conglomerated become
larger, many variables, particularly from the Census, require reweighting before
they can be employed. This is both tricky and laborious; it is easy to see why previ-
ous analysts preferred simply to drop these cases. The result, however, is that our
study is the only one that actually reports on data for the entire state.12
But while we are confident that our study sheds new light on MCAS, it is also
necessary to point out some limitations. First, the data we analyze represent results
from what are now widely known as “quasi-experiments.” Like astronomers or an-
thropologists, we are limited to observing variables in combinations found “in the
wild.” In contrast to laboratory scientists, we cannot design experiments to help sort
co-occurring phenomena. This point may sound like a truism. It is not. Its sweeping
implications for statistical studies have only recently been widely taken to heart by
methodologists. Since one cannot manipulate, one cannot randomize the objects one
is studying. And since we have only a few years of data, some techniques one might
use to get around this problem are unavailable. It is thus difficult to rule out vari-
ables that are really irrelevant but happen to be strongly correlated with what one is
studying or, conversely, to recognize the significance of hidden variables that are
subtly correlated with the more obvious variables one is studying.13
Further Cautions
Statistical multicollinearity almost always aggravates these problems; for example,
income, race, ethnicity, poverty, and many other variables — such as school dropout
rates — are frequently so highly correlated that they cannot easily be distinguished
statistically, even in large samples. This makes for potentially mistaken analysis
because it inflates the variance of one’s estimates and thus muddies results. (The
other horn of this dilemma also has potentially important policy implications: Sepa-
rately reporting scores by race or gender, without controls for the omitted variables,
as both the DOE and some academic studies have done, overstates the importance of
the highlighted variable since it appears to be responsible for all the variation.)
Techniques exist for recognizing and treating multicollinearity, and we have made
heavy use of them, since we are extremely reluctant to rely on the most common
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approach — which is simply to drop most of the offending variables — without
some evidence about which works best or misleads the least.14 Nevertheless, the
reader is warned.
Other yellow caution flags need to be raised as well. Our data for income and
related economic magnitudes treat the state as having a uniform price level as if it is
no more or less expensive to live in one town or another. This is surely an oversim-
plification, but price deflators for individual towns or counties do not exist, so there
is no practical alternative. Note, however, that formulas for state aid do claim to
make allowances for differing prices, so some corrections are built into the data.15
It is also important to note that our data are for entire school districts. They thus
aggregate results for groups of groups of groups: students nested in classes, within
schools, inside districts. We work only on district data. Once again, the problem this
situation generates — that of so-called “cross level” inference — has received much
attention in recent statistical literature. Still the major pitfalls bear repeating: Data
this highly aggregated display much less variability than do individual scores. So an
apparently minor difference in scores between districts can signal a yawning gulf,
rather than a minor difference, although many individual scores within the lower
scoring unit will still tower over many in the higher.
But the most important warning concerns the “ecological fallacy.” If units at one
level of analysis, say, districts, display a correlation between scores and some char-
acteristic (such as ethnicity), it does not necessarily follow that this correlation holds
true at other levels; for example, between schools within districts or within particu-
lar grade levels or classrooms. Indeed, an exactly opposite pattern may hold at other
levels. An example from political science illustrates how easily the best laid plans of
a whole discipline can go astray: Before the advent of modern sampling techniques,
political analysts frequently tried to descry trends in ethnic voting by focusing on
precincts that were heavily dominated by particular voting blocs. Now everyone
recognizes that voters living in such peculiar niches may be wildly unrepresentative
of their ethnic group as a whole.16
The concentration on district-level outcomes affects our results in other, subtler
ways. Some of the apparent variation among districts really represents variation
between schools or neighborhoods within these districts as well as, quite possibly,
between teachers. These factors, however, are not modeled in this paper. Instead, all
variation appears as variation across districts. Capturing variations below this level
— at the level of the schools or classes — would require substantial reconfiguration
of the GIS data available to us. We have, accordingly, reluctantly put off the investi-
gation for another time.17
Though we gathered new data on some key variables ourselves, such as superin-
tendents’ salaries, there are other data we would still like to have.18 For example,
recent evidence suggests that school grading practices influence student perfor-
mance, and thus, presumably, MCAS results.19 We also suspect that the widespread
practice of starting high school classes very early in the morning to economize on
transportation costs by employing school buses in shifts seriously affects student
achievement. But the Department of Education does not publish data on these topics.
Given our focus on districts, we have not found any way to investigate cases where
there is reason to suspect that the MCAS exams were compromised in a particular
school.20 Like the troops on all sides at the battle of Borodino, accordingly, we try to
make sense of the situation as we find it.
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I. What We Study:
The Dependent Variable and Data
At Borodino Tolstoy claimed that Napoleon could not tell “where what he had seen
was” when he lifted his eyes from his spyglass and “looked again with the naked
eye.”21 Something like this confusion exists with regard to MCAS scores. As men-
tioned, the Department of Education reports the results of the tests for both schools
and districts. But the DOE does not consolidate results for the separate tests — En-
glish, Math, Science, and the like — into a single “grand average” for each grade
level. Neither does it publicly aggregate results for all grade levels and schools into
district average scores.
But these are easily calculated from the data. If one believes, as virtually every-
one does (including ourselves), that every grade level is equally important and that
results for separate tests should figure equally in the overall average, then the task of
computing grand averages for districts or schools is akin to computing the average
of a single test with nine parts.22 (Nine, because each district in the period with
which we are concerned administered three different tests to students in the fourth,
eighth, and tenth grades.) It is only necessary to add up the scores on each part and
divide the resulting total by the number of children who took each test. The result
will be what everyone recognizes as the average (mean) score for the district or
school.23
The DOE does not, of course, list individual scores. But it does post average
scores for each particular test and the number of children who took it. Multiplying
these average scores by the number of pupils taking each particular test and then
summing the resulting figures yields the same figure one would arrive at if one
worked from original, individual test scores. Since the same total results, the num-
ber can, once again, be divided by the total number of students taking each test to
arrive at an overall average.
Here, however, lies a snare celebrated in the lore of statistics. Since the tests are
given on different days, the number of students taking each varies, sometimes sub-
stantially.24 If one worked from individual test results, this would become obvious
during the count. It is much less obvious if the data list the number of students tak-
ing each test and the corresponding average test scores in separate columns, as the
DOE data does. In this latter circumstance, it is insidiously easy to make the mistake
of trying to calculate averages for each unit without reference to the varying num-
bers of students who take each test. One is strongly tempted simply to add the
“unweighted” test scores for each grade level. The combined total for all grades can
be reported by itself as a sort of summary number; or, if one wants to calculate what
looks like the “average,” one can, once again, succumb to temptation and divide the
combined total by the number of tests. However one does it, the results will be
wrong.
Every published school ranking we have seen, including those in the Boston
Globe, relies on these “unweighted” averages.25 In Appendix 1, accordingly, we rank
each district correctly based on the same DOE data used by the Boston Globe. We
display results for each year, along with a consolidated “grand average” for all three
years.26
 The new results are invariably interesting, even when they are not earthshaking.
In 1998 and 1999, the Boston Globe hailed the schools of the town of Harvard as
the best in the state.27 Correctly calculated results suggest that the Harvard system is
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indeed outstanding. But in both 1998 and 1999, the Wellesley school system nar-
rowly topped it. By no means are all the corrections this minor, particularly when
one traces year-to-year changes in relative standings. Some shifts are quite large. For
example, if one compares our results for 1999 with those presented in the Globe,
some districts fall as much as 16 places. While we have not bothered to extend the
comparison, a similar error in the opposite direction in the following year would
imply a comparatively huge reshuffling.
The last column of figures in our Appendix 1, the “Grand Average 1998–2000,”
supplies the variable we analyze in the next section of the paper. The figure for each
school district reflects the combined weights of all three tests (math, science, and
English) for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. These averages reflect the work of so-
called “regular” students — those who are not handicapped or otherwise specially
disadvantaged.28 The DOE separately reports scores for a wide variety of special
student populations, including most English as a second language (ESL) students, as
well as for vocational-technical school students. We believe that all of these merit
careful attention — the question of who does well teaching handicapped students is,
after all, a first-order problem of public policy, as is the question of how MCAS can
be fairly administered to students in vocational schools, where curricula often differ
by design from curricula in other schools. But test scores for such students cannot
sensibly be analyzed using a model designed for the majority of students. In this
paper, we are concerned only with these latter.
II. Modeling the Determinants of
School District Success in
the MCAS: Cross-Sectional Results
In the spirit of the French and Russian commanders who began their preparations for
the battle of Borodino by surveying the terrain, we first look at some plots of the
test score data. Figure 1 presents a year-to-year overview of the scores by grade
level, before they are rolled into the grand averages that we analyze. It is immedi-
ately apparent that the fourth grade scores run somewhat higher than scores in the
eighth or tenth grades. This figure, however, tells us only about statewide average
Figure 1
Test Score Trends
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Figure 2
District Scores
Variation in Range and Average
scores. It gives no clues to variations between school districts. Figure 2, which stat-
isticians will at once recognize as a so-called “box plot,” does just this. The length of
the thin vertical lines for each year’s scores marks the range of variation among
district averages. They stretch from a low of just under 220 to a peak of a bit less
than 250. The long rectangles between each pair of lines enclose, by convention, the
middle half of all scores. Comparing the midpoints of each rectangle, we see that in
1999 the average score declined very slightly. Scores then rose rather substantially in
2000.
 The geography of the test scores is interesting and important. Figure 3 plots all
district grand averages on a state map, using GIS technology. This map is fairly
brimming with implications for individual communities. The low scores of the
state’s large cities are apparent, as is the belt of high scoring suburbs encircling Bos-
ton along Route 128. The moderately low scores of rural districts are also easy to
spot. So is another fact that is crucial for our paper: Neighborhood effects appear to
be powerful. That is, many districts strongly resemble their neighbors. (See the
Moran Tests for spatial autocorrelation, presented in Appendix 3, which confirm the
judgment of the eye.)
The patchy geography of MCAS scores throws a shadow over the technique most
commonly employed in educational statistics — that of ordinary least squares
New England Journal of Public Policy
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regression. For, alas, least squares regression requires inflexibly that the residuals —
the errors in values predicted by our model — not be correlated with each other.
That is, in plain English, the predictive error for Wellesley needs to be random with
respect to the errors for neighboring towns such as Weston, Sherborn, Newton, or
Dover. The map warns that it obviously will not be, since their scores all fall within
a narrow range.
Previous studies of MCAS have ignored this point. Indeed, none appear to have
run any test for autocorrelation at all. But since MCAS scores are highly correlated
across districts, there is no real alternative to adopting spatial regression techniques.
These techniques require special software, but are otherwise not onerous. Once the
autocorrelation is removed, one can proceed pretty much along customary lines,
though the need to calculate spatial weights for every district complicates some
econometric procedures and renders impossible many common tests of the effects of
outlying data points. The difference this makes in the residuals for the resulting
equation is easy to see if one compares the residuals of our spatial regression model
with the non-spatial version in our Appendix 3.
A plot of the values of our dependent variable — the three year district grand
average — reveals something else. In a world in which the “bell curve” has the
power of a symbol on a par with the cross or the American eagle, the MCAS — like
most other well designed tests — rings in tones all its own. Figure 4 shows the dis-
tribution of scores for the three year grand average. While the unweighted scores
could plausibly be claimed to resemble a normal curve (1), this claim is undercut if
the scores are appropriately weighted (2).29
A close look at the right side of Figure 4(2) shows almost no high scoring dis-
tricts. Since the Department of Education has now changed the scoring system for
the English test, we can simply state the obvious: scores on the fourth grade English
Figure 3
Grand Average District Scores
87
School District Performance Under the MCAS
tests for 1998, 1999, and 2000 were light years away from a normal distribution,
and the number of high scores was curiously low. (Compare Figure 5, which shows
the distribution of scores on the fourth grade English test for 1999.) Critics who
suggested that this test was too difficult appear to have had a good argument.30
Figure 4
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We now turn to our central concern, which is to trace the sources of variation in
district scores as fully as we can. We do this by estimating a spatial regression equa-
tion, which we present formally in Appendix 4. This equation allows us to disen-
tangle the factors that affect district MCAS scores and to explain our statistical re-
sults in plain English. We also discuss the rationales for testing certain variables.
We began by testing basic economic and demographic variables that are widely
thought to affect school performance.31 Almost every study, for example, finds a
relation between a school or district’s test scores and its average income. Many also
suggest that other economic variables, such as the poverty rate, make a substantial
difference. To the extent that it makes any sense to distinguish these from “eco-
nomic” influences, many studies also indicate that certain demographic variables are
relevant. We examined a very large number of economic and demographic variables.
Along with average income, these included the percentage of the population receiv-
ing assistance under the Temporary Aid To Families With Dependent Children Pro-
gram (TAFDC); the percentage of families with two parents living in the house; the
percentage of families in which one or both parents attended college; poverty rates;
the percentage of students classified in DOE statistical reports as white, African-
American, Asian, Hispanic, and so forth.32
Like almost everyone else, we found many of these variables exceedingly diffi-
cult to distinguish from one another statistically. In several cases we relied on so-
called “principal components” regression; in others we examined how the respective
variables worked in various combinations, along with standard indicators of
multicollinearity such as Condition Indices. Such efforts can easily produce the
Figure 5
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statistical counterpart of “cabin fever”: The addition of one or another variable
sometimes promises (or threatens) to reshape the whole equation. Census and DOE
“racial” classifications, for example, proved fertile ground for all sorts of complica-
tions, since “white” and many “minority” categories can cancel or re-enforce each
other, depending on the sample and the facts of the case. Some variables also prove
to be related to school dropout rates. On the other hand, “limited English,” a cat-
egory that one might have expected to be closely related to some Census classifica-
tions (such as Hispanic), turned out not to be strongly correlated with many inde-
pendent variables.33
Eventually we settled on three economic and demographic variables that give the
best overall fit and, in our dataset, are not multicollinear. These are the district’s
average income, the percentage of two-parent households, and the percentage of the
population receiving TAFDC payments. Our statistical results, presented in equation
form in Appendix 4, suggest that every $1,000 increase in a school district’s per
capita income raises average MCAS scores by approximately half a point. A one
percent rise in the percentage of families with two parents, by contrast, raises scores
about one-seventh of a point. (Here it may be wise to recall that among large
groups, apparently small differences in scores frequently signal impressive
discontinuities.) The extent of poverty within districts appears to have a major effect
on MCAS scores: For every percentage point increase in the number of recipients of
aid through the program for Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
MCAS scores decline over a point and a half.
Like others who have pursued such inquiries, we are impressed with the impor-
tance of these variables, which are, in a fundamental sense to be discussed later,
extraneous to schools. While one or another study might argue for another closely
related variable that we ultimately rejected, such as percentage of families with col-
lege educated parents (too highly correlated with income), or a district’s poverty
level (we rely instead on TAFDC percentages), our results here probably will not
surprise most other analysts.
Our examination of DOE “racial” variables produced a somewhat more compli-
cated result. To begin with, we note that the usage of “race” here is severely mis-
leading. Like most anthropologists, we reject any idea of pure, biologically defin-
able races. Ever since the first humans left Africa, groups have been intermingling
and interbreeding. Neither do we have any truck with hereditary theories. We con-
sider “bell curve” theories of genetically determined intelligence plainly false and
absurdly oversimplified.34 To the extent that categories such as “white” or “His-
panic” make sense, it is as indicators of broad (and commonly, diffuse) “cultural-
historical” influences.35 Language and history in given ecological and material con-
texts are crucial, not unique group genes.
It was not difficult to find census categories for race that produced plausible ini-
tial results.36 But as our investigation became more specific, these variables — from
“Asian” to “Hispanic” and even “white” — receded in importance, with one excep-
tion that has an obvious “cultural-historical” interpretation. A one percent increase in
the percentage of African-Americans within a district tends to push down a district’s
average MCAS scores by approximately one-fifth of a point. We caution again that
we are looking at district, and not school data, but the origins of this gap are almost
certainly not rocket science: Not the biology of the “bell curve,” but the legacy of
segregation, with its broad implications of chronic underfunding, shaky administra-
tion, and weak support structures for high level academic performance.
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In recent years, an increasing number of studies have looked beyond demography
and economics to assess the influence of health and environmental factors. So did
we. Taking advantage of a recently published ranking of Massachusetts towns, we
tested for a relation of MCAS scores to environmental hazards within districts.37
When the equation included our controls for per capita income and other variables,
no statistically reliable relation surfaced.
We also considered a range of political variables, which conventional analyses of
school achievement and testing rarely examine. With a nod to the old witticism that
Alfred Kinsey would have made a memorable contribution to political science if
only he had inquired after party identification, we first checked for influence of the
partisan affiliations of districts’ representatives in the Massachusetts House and Sen-
ate. We also investigated whether the statistic that Massachusetts Secretaries of State
hasten to report on election night — the percentage of registered voters casting bal-
lots — matters, as well as the much less reported (and far lower) percentage of those
voting who were potentially eligible to vote, whether or not they registered. Because
we were skeptical that any of these traditional variables would bear much relation to
real outcomes, we examined another possibility — whether, in a state like Massachu-
setts, where so many lavishly financed incumbents face no opponent at all, simply
having a challenger on the ballot in 1998 or 2000 made a difference. While assur-
edly a political variable, this is not one commonly tested by political scientists, who
are usually over-impressed by conventional party identifications and regularly con-
fuse “Hail to the Chief” with Aaron Copland’s “Fanfare for the Common Man.”38
Our findings were provocative. The conventional political variables we tested —
the party affiliation of district representatives in the Massachusetts House and Senate
for 1998 and 2000; voting turnout as a percentage of registered voters, or the per-
centage of those potentially eligible to vote, registered or not, for 1998, 2000, and
averages of both years — all bore no relation to district MCAS scores.
By contrast, in the money-driven Massachusetts political system, where competi-
tive political races are akin to natural wonders, it turns out that MCAS scores of
school districts with contested elections to the state Senate in 2000 (by anyone at all,
even candidates of “minor” parties such as Ross Perot’s “Reform Party”39) averaged
over half a point higher than elsewhere — to repeat, a considerable amount in a
study as highly aggregated as ours.
This result is certainly not conventional in the literature on educational statistics.
A number of qualifications are in order, together with some speculations about its
meaning. First, it would not be surprising if this finding ultimately proved to be an
artifact of some other, more fundamental variable. But the regression controls for
the most obvious confounding variable, income. And we have not, so far, been able
to find a variable, or set of variables, that takes out the effect.
The basic finding is marvelous in its simplicity: School performance is better in
districts where there are contested elections. But the restrictions to Senate elections
and the year 2000 raise questions. Elections for the House did not affect district
MCAS scores. Neither did facing an opponent in the 1998 Senate elections. The
result also holds only when all three years of data are analyzed together rather than
individually, though there are perfectly sensible reasons why this should be the
case.40 Our data contain little that can help resolve these doubts, but several facts
may be worth noting. First, by 2000, after three years of MCAS testing, educational
reform was a front-burner political issue. The Senate was a key political arena. Sen-
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ate President Thomas Birmingham, one of the architects of the original reform,
championed the issue and was protecting program funding. The House, by contrast,
has been less actively identified with the question. Second, 2000 was a presidential
election year. As a consequence a great deal more money and organizational support
poured into state politics that year. It may be that these extra resources spilled over
into some marginally non-competitive Senate districts and empowered challengers,
so that there is nothing really mysterious about the unique significance of that elec-
tion. But real answers require more research. This paper can merely point to evi-
dence of something like a “Birmingham effect” on MCAS scores during the 2000
Senate elections.
We next shifted focus, to search for “school-related” variables that might influ-
ence test scores. Once again, we considered a large number. We analyzed the influ-
ence of teacher salaries in two ways. First, we examined the impact of maximum
salaries in these highly unionized systems. Then we tested for the effect of average
teacher salaries. The DOE does not collect any data on superintendents’ salaries. But
such data are obviously relevant to educational performance. Since superintendents’
salaries are public information, we undertook a major effort to collect them for
every district in the state. Eventually, after much resistance, we succeeded.
Since, despite recent challenges, conventional wisdom in education studies is that
“money doesn’t matter” for school achievement, we begin by observing that our
results show clearly that it does matter in certain definite ways. Both teachers’ maxi-
mum salaries and superintendent salaries materially affect test scores: Our equation
suggests that raising the maximum teacher’s salary (a level presumably enjoyed by
relatively few teachers, since it represents the top of a unionized system) by $1,000
drives up MCAS scores by approximately a seventh of a point, while raising the
superintendent’s salary by $1,000 pushes up district MCAS scores rather less — by
about a twentieth of a point. While the latter may not sound like much, one needs to
bear in mind that we are talking about a single person’s salary, though it would not
be surprising if that figure turned out to be related to some other salaries. But not to
those of the teachers: Rather to our surprise, the degree of multicollinearity between
these two statistics is not damagingly high.
Because we are convinced that a weakness of contemporary quantitative educa-
tional research is its lack of interest in managerial variables other than unionization,
we experimented with various models of the relation between top management and
teachers. But multicollinearity frustrated all of these attempts.
We were surprised to discover that average teacher salaries as opposed to maxi-
mum teacher salaries do not appear to matter. It may well be, however, that in
highly unionized systems like those of Massachusetts, this statistic mostly reflects the
balance struck in any given year between relatively high salaried retirements and
new hires who are paid relatively less. If this is the case, it is worth noting that re-
placing older with younger teachers, assuming that is what lower average salaries
signal, did not raise MCAS scores. Nothing in our data supports facile notions that
replacing (“burned out”) veteran teachers with an influx of eager young pedagogues
somehow improves student performance.
For each school district, the state reports how total spending is allocated among
various budget categories. Though some DOE data clearly are problematic, officials
we queried generally respect the accuracy of these figures, so we subjected them to
analysis. We found two that affected scores. One needs only to be described for its
New England Journal of Public Policy
92
plausibility to be apparent: As total spending rises as a percent of the state’s estimate
of a district’s foundation budget, MCAS scores go up. (The spending figures were
for 1997–98, which is important. A primary aim of the state’s school financing re-
forms was to bring every school district up to 100% of foundation spending by
2000. Districts are also allowed to spend more than the foundation budget, and
many do.) Our results imply that for every percentage point district spending in-
creases as a percent of the state’s foundation budget target, average scores rise by
three hundredths of a point — a substantial impact, since the discussion is about
percentages that, in affluent districts, frequently exceed 100% of the state target.
By contrast, the other budgetary category that appears to influence MCAS scores
operates less conventionally. As spending on books and equipment rises by one per-
cent, MCAS scores actually decline by a hundreth of a point. We find this less mys-
terious than might be thought. Equipment may be a category in school system bud-
gets where all sorts of expenditures are buried with minimal fanfare. Some of these
are surely very large — computer expenditures, for example — and a considerable
number may well be wasted.41 It is also, alas, indisputable that certain districts have
sometimes purchased large numbers of the textbooks that they subsequently failed to
distribute. Our results, however, do not appear to depend critically on one or two
large districts whose problems in this area are well known or widely suspected.
Our investigation of the effects of athletic spending on MCAS performance were
quite provocative. They should give pause to anyone who believes that school poli-
cies or money makes no difference to school performance. Our regression indicates
that for each one percent that a district spends of the amount targeted for athletics in
the state’s benchmark “foundation budget” for that district, MCAS scores fall by
approximately a hundredth of a point. To understand the implications of this result,
it helps to remember that some districts spend more than 300% of the (athletic
spending) target, dragging down their MCAS scores proportionately.
Why should athletic spending have such negative effects on MCAS performance?
The most natural suspicion, that districts that spend proportionately more on athlet-
ics are frittering away resources better spent on improving academic performance
may well be true, but there is no reason to limit the effect this narrowly. Debates
about the role of sports in schooling typically focus on high schools, where the most
time, money, and publicity are spent on athletics. But our regression results refer to
districts as a whole. We do not find this at all implausible: like analysts who increas-
ingly model schools as “nested” variables, our observation is that school systems are
hierarchies, with the high schools normally representing the biggest investment,
carrying higher salaries, and setting the tone for districts as a whole. Frequently,
lower level sports programs are structured to function as “feeders” for the high
school, projecting the dominant level’s influence into the lower grades. And, as
anyone who has ever lived in a district with a championship football or basketball
team can testify, the team’s aura radiates far beyond the high school.
This last observation, which is rooted in common experience, and not our data,
raises a caution about how the distorting effect of sports might operate in practice.
For, after all, it is the district as a whole that suffers: No matter how pathologically
averse to hitting the books a whole football or basketball team may be, by itself it
cannot drag down an entire district. There are just too few cases.
For sports success to materially lower district MCAS scores, it must affect many
more students than those on the teams. Our guess — and it is no more than that — is
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that sports success distorts the managerial and academic focus of schools as much as
the budget. One of us attended a high school in the Midwest that was a perennial
challenger in state basketball tournaments. As tournament time approached, a sort of
magical cloud descended on students, teachers, and, at length, even members of the
administration. Not only money, but time and energy of both students and faculty
were diverted, sometimes for weeks. And all through the year “school spirit” and the
sense of achievement it embodied were hard to distinguish from the ghost of cham-
pionships past. But figuring out precisely how sports success affects MCAS scores
is, again, a problem for future research.42
Wary of the (handsomely subsidized) flourish of trumpets that accompanies con-
temporary discussions of schools, computers, and the internet, we checked whether
the number of students per computer or the percentage of classrooms with internet
access made any difference to districts’ MCAS results. We found that the number of
students per computer had no effect on test scores. But to our surprise, we did dis-
cover that a one percent rise in the percentage of students with access to the web
raises test scores by a hundredth of a point. (Once again, since the results are about
percentages, this effect is not negligible.) It is possible – we simply lack the data to
tell – that this result truly registers the effect of some other unobserved variable.
(Note that our equation does control for income, thus we are not simply dealing
with an effect of higher incomes.) Alert school managements, for example, may
simply be quick to jump on the latest bandwagon, so that we are really measuring
managerial quality. The result might even reflect some totally extraneous factor,
such as the age of school buildings, since new buildings are now wired for comput-
ers, or perhaps the novelty of the internet increases student attention. Once again,
however, we cannot make judgments on these issues on the basis of the data in hand.
We wondered if the existence of formal early childhood programs raised test
scores or if a district’s participation in the METCO busing program might, as some
have feared, deleteriously affect performance. We were also anxious to see if varia-
tions in student/teacher ratios or the percentage of special education (“handicapped”)
students mattered. Here our results were mixed. We found no evidence that a
district’s participation in METCO affected test scores one way or the other. Nor do
variations in student/teacher ratios appear to make any difference – though here a
simple explanation completely reverses the obvious implication: This ratio does not
now vary widely between districts, since it has long been an object of discussion,
controversy, and special targeting. While many fear that spiraling costs of special
education take resources away from the rest of the curriculum, that battle appears to
be over (or perhaps, to have been fought to a draw): We found no evidence that the
percentage of special education students affects district test results. On the other
hand, when the number of students classified as having “limited English” skills in-
creases by one percent, MCAS scores decline by a tenth of a point.44
Another negative result calls for more comment. Nothing we found suggested
that early childhood programs had any effect on MCAS scores. Reflecting that most
of these programs may be of recent vintage, and suspicious that their effects might
wash out as students progressed to higher grades, we substituted fourth grade
(grand) averages for consolidated results from all grade levels as the dependent vari-
able. We still failed to find any relation. Perhaps there really is none. But after re-
viewing these programs, we believe another, more dismal explanation is more plau-
sible. The early childhood variable we used reflects district participation in special
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programs targeted for districts with monumental social problems. In the great sweep
of American social welfare policy from Reagan to Bush and Clinton, to Bush II,
these programs may now be simply too small to make much difference in aggregates
as large as school districts.
We, ourselves, believe that we need to be able to measure the alignment of the
curriculum with MCAS tests. Alas, the only statewide data known to us is a recent
compilation of graduation requirements in school districts that indicate which dis-
tricts require the study of foreign languages and which do not, how many years of
math or English are required for a diploma, and so forth. But it is easy to entertain
doubts about the amount of real information contained in this data: The city of Bos-
ton, which has some of the lowest average test scores in the state (though with an
upward trend), also has some of the toughest requirements on paper. Nevertheless,
we coded the data on requirements and analyzed their impact on MCAS scores, but
we could not find any effects. Whether four or three or only two years of mathemat-
ics are required to get a high school diploma appears to be far less important than
the content and quality of instruction across districts.
Finally we examined one of the hottest controversies now raging in American
education: whether “competition” from charter or private schools has any demon-
strable effect on public school performance. At first impression, our data, which
refer exclusively to regular public schools (and thus include no charter schools)
might not appear very well adapted for this task. But in fact our data should be
highly relevant. Massachusetts law allows towns to permit transfers among schools
within a district. A fair number of municipalities have availed themselves of this
option. If strong claims about the importance of “choice” in school reform are true,
such “intra-district” choice should have some positive effect on MCAS scores, other
things being equal.45 Certain school districts have also taken advantage of a 1991 law
to allow students from other districts to enroll or let their own students leave for
another district. These cases should also show distinctive MCAS results. (As districts
gain or lose students, state funds transit with them.) Finally, formal statistics on the
percentage of students who attend private and parochial schools in various school
districts do not exist, but a good proxy is surely the percentage of students within a
district who do attend public schools. That number is collected by DOE. Accord-
ingly, we investigated the relation of competition to MCAS performance. To our
surprise, we found no effect.
Since we do not doubt that either most school boards or major teacher unions are
less than enamored of potential rivals, we tried various specifications of all these
models, including dummy variables, as well as measures of actual financial losses
and gains from transfers of students. The surprise was that none produced evidence
that any form of “competition” has thus far affected district MCAS scores.
We suspect that ardent advocates of “school choice” will argue that these findings
do not tell decisively against their views. On the whole, we agree, as will become
evident below. Still our results do suggest some caveats to fashionable opinion. For
example, the failure of intra-district choice to make any detectable difference in
MCAS scores perhaps signals that critics of school choice are right in suggesting that
the issue is money as much as it is choice. Affording people in poor school districts
the option of choosing among inadequate schools does not change anything. Effec-
tive demand for good schools, in the sense of demand backed by enough money,
simply is not there. Under “choice” plans currently in force, all that may happen is
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that desperate parents shuffle their children back and forth between marginal, failing
schools. In better districts, the incremental difference in performance may simply
not be worth all the transaction costs of abandoning neighborhood schools. The legal
possibility of moving, in other words, might be a poor indicator of practical abilities
to do so. It may also be that the lack of effect results from uniform conditions im-
posed by reluctant unions or bureaucratic school boards. At any rate, intra-district
choice does not appear to be associated with higher MCAS scores.
Inter-district choice appears to make no difference, either — even in districts that
are losing money because students are draining out of them to neighboring districts.
Here, the argument can be made that the state has so heavily hedged the possibility
of loss, that districts can brush aside their losses indefinitely. This argument is not
foolish – there is no doubt at all that the state does indeed hold down the amount of
money districts can gain or lose in this way. But there are enough districts losing
substantial sums to make one wonder about this hedge.
Our final test of the “choice” view is shadowed by a certain ambiguity, though no
way of making the argument will save it. A high percentage of students attending
public schools might signal that the schools are relatively good compared to private
and parochial alternatives, perhaps because they draw support from the whole com-
munity. Or it may indicate that few viable alternatives exist, though in Massachusetts
Catholic schools, at least, are common. But there is also a sense in which a low per-
centage of students in public schools points to the existence of some form of effec-
tive competition. Whatever meaning one attaches to the percentage of students en-
rolled in public schools within districts, though, it appears that the figure is unre-
lated to MCAS test scores, in the sense that adding the variable to our model yields
no increase in predictive power.
III. Seeking Value Added:
What Income May Not Buy
At Borodino no one, not even Napoleon, could discern who was winning or losing:
“Sometimes cries could be heard through the firing; but it was impossible to tell
what was being done there.” At no time does the MCAS debate more strongly re-
semble Borodino than when one attempts to distinguish which districts have done
particularly well or poorly. Many of the special problems of analyzing score changes
over time are discussed in the next section of this paper. But many disputes about
who is running the best race arise from smoldering suspicions that the contest is
rigged from the start. As one prize-winning columnist for the Boston Globe elo-
quently expressed these misgivings in the context of the argument over high stakes
tests:
That argument would be more compelling if MCAS did not tell us what we already
knew: Poor, urban schools perform much worse than resource-rich suburban schools.
Maybe Wellesley kids are test-savvy, or maybe their scores have more to do with better
equipped libraries; higher-paid teachers; smaller classes; safe, comfortable homes; and
high-achieving parents.46
High stakes testing distorts school priorities.47 The crucial question for public
policy is whether these distortions do less harm than the loss of information and
accountability that such tests provide. This is a question beyond the scope of this
New England Journal of Public Policy
96
paper. But a compelling response is possible to the main objection leveled in this
passage.
The response begins by agreeing with its central premise. Students in affluent
districts do indeed begin with many advantages that help sharpen skills that MCAS
measures. (Note that MCAS purports to measure skills, in sharp contrast to other
kinds of tests that claim to measure the rather more nebulous notion of “aptitude.”48 )
That is why variables such as income, the percentage of TAFDC recipients, and the
percentage of two parent families, show prominently in our cross-sectional equation.
It is also easy to understand the associated beliefs that “demography is destiny”
and that schools themselves are powerless, or nearly so, to enhance fundamental
student skill. But the usual econometric evidence adduced in support of these stron-
ger claims overstates a good case. We have already noted that the typical approach to
studying school district performance under MCAS bypasses the problem of spatial
autocorrelation; there is thus good reason to be suspicious of conventional assess-
ments of the relative importance of various factors in school performance. With
spatial regressions, however, partialing out the influence of particular variables is
somewhat trickier, since there is no single easily computed and widely accepted
criterion analogous to the famous R2 in linear regression that can serve as a gold
standard. Nevertheless, we agree that all reasonable assessments will end up giving
heavy weight to economic and demographic factors.
But our results indicate that customary statistical evidence is problematic: Key
school and policy-related variables are often omitted. Until our paper, for example,
no one appears to have tested whether superintendent salaries mattered for MCAS
performance. Equations purporting to predict MCAS performance left it out. The
same holds for other variables that our analysis suggests may have important effects,
such as internet access, the extent to which school budgets fell short of foundation
budgets in the early stages of reform, and, possibly, even the state of district politi-
cal competition. (Almost everyone considered the influence of teacher salaries,
though not the specification we find to be most powerful, teacher maximum sala-
ries.) The evidence on athletic spending is particularly thought provoking, since our
equations indicate it is so large.49
 The truth is that we simply do not know enough about what influences human
learning to tell how far the state of Massachusetts can move sensibly and incremen-
tally to counterbalance social and economic factors that affect school performance.
But we can be fairly sure that steps like raising maximum teacher and superintendent
salaries would enhance school performance even if we cannot hope anytime soon
fully to unlock the deeper mysteries of income, ethnicity, and social class.
There is another way to approach this whole question, which bypasses the usual
debates: Use the economic, social, and demographic variables that we have shown
predict high performance on the test to control for the advantages enjoyed by afflu-
ent districts. Then see which districts do better — discover, that is, the districts that
consistently outperform their economics and demography.
In essence, this is an approach to school district performance in terms of value
added. The general methodology for approaching the question is well known: One
drops all school-level variables and regresses only the economic and demographic
variables in the original equation on the grand average scores. What results is the
test score that these variables alone would predict for each district. By comparing
predicted with actual test scores (to get a so-called “residual” score), we can quickly
identify which districts are doing better or worse than their demography.50
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Here, once again, our earlier demonstration that MCAS scores are spatially
autocorrelated becomes important. If the original equation is misspecified, so will be
any derived from it. Thus our regression equation for “value added” presented in
Appendix 5, is, again, a spatial regression.
Rankings for individual school districts in terms of “value added” appear in Ap-
pendix 5. Some of these are fascinating. Here, at last, is a list of high performing
schools whose entries cannot possibly be dismissed as simple reflections of socio-
economic advantage. Still near the top are some affluent, high scoring districts whose
performance has been touted in the media on the basis of raw scores. But worries that
so-called “ceiling effects” might crimp progress in the state’s highest scoring districts
turn out to be groundless: The bottom of the list contains some stunning surprises,
including several of the most affluent school districts in the state.51 In the next section
of our analysis we examine whether improvements in school performance as mea-
sured by MCAS can be explained by the state’s sweeping reforms in school financing
in the nineties.
IV. The Question of Change: More
Than Pennies for Their Thoughts
At Borodino, Tolstoy claimed, fighting raged over three separate stretches of ground.
But, the onetime cavalry officer noted, the two side actions were “detached and of
little importance in comparison with what took place in the center of the battlefield.”
The same is not quite true for MCAS, since questions of what drives district MCAS
scores and value added are certainly pivotal. Yet, even before the latest state budget
crisis, the central analytical question about educational reform in Massachusetts was
surely whether the state’s colossal investments in K-12 education since 1993 have had
any demonstrable affect on school district performance.
Researchers from several different econometric traditions have pursued this ques-
tion with imaginative research designs. No one, however, has so far reported any
unambigously positive results. One analyst who tried an unusual “regression continu-
ity” approach reported evidence that the influx of new funds since 1993 raised scores
on MCAS’s “low stakes” predecessor, the Massachusetts Education Assessment Pro-
gram (MEAP). But he detected an effect only for fourth grade tests and only in his-
torically low spending districts.52 All other grades registered no effects. Analysts who
have scrutinized data for MCAS itself all report mixed or even negative effects. Cus-
tomarily, they temper their findings with the caution that it is too soon to tell, be-
cause analyses of changes in test scores are uniquely complex and difficult.
Their diffidence is not a smokescreen. The fundamental problem arises from a
stark statistical fact — one that is appreciated by scarcely anyone but specialists: Test
scores contain an astonishingly large random component — according to some quite
careful estimates, as much as forty percent of all the year to year variance in school
scores could be illusory.53 Sorting out real changes from purely accidental fluctua-
tions is much more difficult than most politicians, educators, or citizens are likely to
believe. And how to do so has been highly contentious, even among statisticians.
Consider the Nixon-like career of the statistic most people would instinctively
identify as the obvious starting point for analyses of change — the raw “gain” or
“change” score. This is calculated as the difference between successive administra-
tions of the “same” (really, comparable) tests. A generation ago, nearly all studies
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considered change scores useful evidence. Then came a series of sharp critiques, as
statisticians took a closer look at its properties. Soon a variety of successively more
complicated substitutes proliferated: “residualized change scores,” “estimated true
scores,” “forward estimated true scores,” and so forth. Just as suddenly, the pendu-
lum of professional opinion swung back. Critiques of the critiques blossomed.
Change scores began staging what two celebrated statisticians recently hailed as an
“amazing comeback.”54
Some of the thorniest issues derive from the phenomenon of “regression to the
mean.” This is almost diabolically subtle: Because of random error in scores, high
scoring schools frequently do slightly less well the second time round, while low
scoring schools tend to score higher. The resulting illusions would be comic, if their
consequences were not so incendiary: principals and superintendents in the high
scoring schools tear out their hair over the apparent decline in performance — or
failure to meet DOE standards for “improvement.” Simultaneously their counter-
parts in low scoring schools bask in community approval and campaign for “re-
wards” commensurate with their proud “improvements.” In neither case, however,
has any real change taken place. All one may be witnessing is another round in a
dice game. Or the battle of Borodino, where Tolstoy insisted, generals could not
easily tell where the lines were or who was winning.
The problem is particularly nettlesome in small schools, where low numbers of
pupils taking exams can permit random effects to bulk correspondingly larger. There
is no doubt MCAS scores are affected. Both statisticians and journalists have noticed
the frequency with which small schools bounce on and off rosters of the state’s
“most improved” schools.55
Additional misgivings arise from the implications of the crucial fact, noted ear-
lier, that social scientists only rarely can perform controlled experiments. Normally,
they have to make do with data they find. 56 These have led to a realization that rely-
ing on only two data points frequently nourishes “spurious negative correlations”
because the “measurement errors in the pre-test (the first of two “scores” under
analysis) and the observed change score are negatively correlated.” 57 As a result,
studies of change that rely on only two data points have now become rare, with the
use of multi-wave panel data the norm.58
Such statistical obstacles help cast a shadow over the effort to link money to
school outcomes. Many who have studied the question claim that “money doesn’t
matter,” at least not very much. They argue that public schools — particularly
unionized public schools — are inherently inefficient. While some of these critics
believe they can demonstrate that good teachers can indeed raise students’ scores,
they maintain that school bureaucracies and teacher unions dampen incentives for
good teachers. Though some research now claims to qualify these views or find
important exceptions, this negative appraisal still dominates the literature.59
Our approach to this battleground borrows a leaf from commanders on both sides
at Borodino, who were acutely conscious of the need for planning their lines of
attack. As before, we first try to clarify the nature of the data. In this instance, a few
pictures are worth thousands of words. In the spirit of recently developed techniques
for analyzing panel data (which is technically what our sample of repeatedly mea-
sured districts is) over time, we plot every district’s scores for all three years in
which the tests were clearly comparable. The result is a set of so-called “growth
curves” for the individual districts. But there are 226 of these, so we aggregate them
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into four overarching patterns according to simple rules. This distillation summa-
rizes much more efficiently the broad pattern of change among MCAS scores over
three years.
The critical step comes next. We analyze how a wide variety of social and eco-
nomic variables shape these growth curves through the application of recent tech-
niques of “multi-level” or “hierarchical linear” modeling. Emphasizing the impor-
tance of always relying on more than two measurements in any analysis of change,
this highly flexible approach treats the time pattern of individual district scores as a
first level of analysis. Potential explanatory variables become a second level. Both
levels are estimated at once in a single equation with a unified set of error terms.
Once again, the details of the equation and its somewhat complex estimation proce-
dures appear in Appendix 7.60
As noted above (Figure 2), on average, district scores declined from 1998 to
1999, before rising in 2000. But experiences were not uniform. Figure 6 plots grand
averages for every district for each year and connects the scores.61 The resulting set
of individual district “growth curves” is dizzyingly complex.
Figure 6
Three Year Growth Curves  All Districts
Figure 7 represents our effort to abstract out basic patterns of change in the raw
scores. We sort every district into one of four exhaustive and exclusive categories:
The handful of districts whose scores went up with each test; the four that declined
each time; those where scores first fell and then rose (the most common pattern);
and finally the relatively few districts whose scores first rose and then fell. Provided
one bears in mind that each of the thick lines represents the mean of a different
distribution, around which the districts belonging to each group are scattered, the
figure can be treated as a summary of performance in the state as a whole.
To investigate the relation between these changing district scores and the state’s
investment in K-12 education, the original figure with 226 growth curves has to be
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translated back into sets of numbers and then analyzed in relation to changes in state
spending in each district. Here recent advances in the multilevel modeling of growth
curves provide real assistance. First, we use all the data to compute an average rate
of change for each district. Where the district scores are plotted as a function of
time, this has an easy geometric interpretation: The average annual rate of change is
equal to the average of the slopes of each year’s change in score with respect to time
(one year, in both cases). Appendix 6 displays numerical values of each district’s rate
of improvement.62 It is apparent that these rates vary. Now the question is whether
these rates of improvement can be explained by the state’s sharply rising investments
in K-12 education, along with perhaps other district characteristics.
Here it is important to understand how the 1993 Massachusetts Education Reform
Act altered school financing. As in other states that introduced similar reforms
around that time, a major intent of the legislation was to raise the level of spending
in poorer districts that had historically spent less. The idea was to supplement tradi-
tional, locally based sources of funds — principally the property tax — with sub-
stantial amounts of direct state aid along with a required minimum level of local tax
contributions. The vast influx of new money was also clearly intended as part of a
grand bargain that would induce school boards and teachers unions to accept what
became MCAS and some structural reforms in the way school services are delivered.
In this respect, the Act aimed at improving education in the state as a whole.
The scale of the subsequent financial transfers is indeed impressive, though it is
important to remember that, because of the colossal spending cutbacks the state
made during the earlier recession, for the first few years most of these funds went to
restore the status quo.63 The main channel for state aid has been so-called “Chapter
70” funds, which flow to school districts under a variety of complex formulas. The
state established a target “foundation budget” for every district, which varies with
district characteristics and is adjusted every year to take account of changing circum-
Figure 7
Change in District Grand Averages
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stances. The foundation budget is not a design for living — it merely sets a floor for
expenditures. Districts can, and many do, spend far more, especially, it appears, on
athletics. Initially many poorer districts spent much less than their target foundation
budgets in many categories. Under the reform, state aid increased in successive
years, so that by 2000 every district was at least spending at the minimum (founda-
tion) level.64
The MCAS scores we analyze in this paper fall in this period of transition; and
our cross-sectional regression indicated that the amount of money that a district
spent under or over its foundation budget definitely affected its scores. There is thus
good reason to believe that bringing every district up to at least 100% of foundation
spending would indeed influence school district performance. But this is quite a
different question from showing that changes in MCAS scores in general are system-
atically related to changes in state aid.
Many factors could muddle results, even if a relation really exists. For example,
though direct aid to school districts from the federal government is generally very
modest, some districts in the state — mostly poorer ones — do receive significant
amounts of money. To the extent this money is wisely used, it will loosen the corre-
lation of score change and state aid. Affluent districts are also free to increase spend-
ing from their own resources and, as the recent history of school override votes
illustrates, some certainly do. This, too, will lower any correlation, as might the less
commonly discussed possibility that some districts could take advantage of the state
aid to restrict the growth of their own contributions.
A particularly tricky question is precisely how long it takes spending to affect
district MCAS results. We have data for actual total spending for every district from
1994 and per pupil expenditure on regular day students from 1993 onward. Data
also exists on the amount of “Chapter 70” spending for each district. It is possible to
imagine many plausible models of how these might influence district scores. One
might in particular wonder how important current spending is compared to past
spending, particularly as one considers scores from higher grades, where the students
are older and in school longer. If past spending has lagged effects — either because
it takes some years to cumulate to something meaningful, or because spending in the
more remote past eventually fades into insignificance — it could be difficult to
detect even a fairly strong relationship.
We considered many possibilities, including models that closely resemble equa-
tions often estimated by econometricians. But our data are technically repeated mea-
sures on the same districts. In testing for the effects of money on MCAS scores, it is
essential to take account of this data “dependence,” or one will end up reporting far
more independent observations that there actually are. For this type of problem, so-
called “random coefficient” or “multilevel” models provide a superior approach and
are now widely used for such tasks within educational statistics.
For technical reasons such models have to be estimated by complex iterative
methods — often, but not always, by maximum likelihood. Thus one is well-advised
to search for relatively straightforward models.65 Considering the variety of ways
state money might affect MCAS scores, we were surprised to find a simple model
that was also consistent with our cross-sectional findings. Again, Appendix 7 pre-
sents the full equation. Here our concern is with the meaning of the results.
The model estimates how (linear versions of) the 226 “growth curves” of Figure
6 vary and the relation of this variation to different explanatory variables. Both the
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starting point and the slope of each line provide important information — the first
about factors that influence the initial level of district school achievement; the sec-
ond about what controls the rate of progress. One thus uses the multilevel approach
to model both the intercept — where the line starts — and the slope, analyzing each
separately in relation to different explanatory variables.
In light of our cross-sectional findings, discussed earlier, our results here are
striking. Seven variables that figured prominently in the cross-sectional model influ-
ence the intercept. Analogously to the way each worked in the earlier equation, four
— per capita income, the percentage of families with two parent families, teacher
maximum salaries, and superintendents’ salaries — operate to raise it. Three — the
percentages of households receiving TAFCD assistance and proportionately higher
numbers of ESL and African-American students — push it down.66
By contrast, we have so far identified only two variables influencing the slope,
the rate at which districts improve from their initial position: The amount by which
state Chapter 70 aid rose between 1994 and 2000 as a percent of actual total district
spending and the change in household income within the district between 1989 and
1999. Since both of these are percentages and can be easily confused with other,
similar sounding numbers, it is worth taking a closer look at each.
The figure for change in median household income is a straight measure of per-
centage change, obtained by subtracting median household income in each district
for 1989 from the corresponding data in newly released 1999 U.S. Census figures
and then dividing by the 1989 figure.67 On average district median household in-
come increased by about six percent. But the now widely discussed polarization of
American income distribution holds also for Massachusetts school districts: The
range of variation was enormous.68 A fair number of districts actually registered
negative growth rates in median household income, while others showed increases as
high as 75%. Our statistical results, presented in Appendix 7, suggest that for each
one percent that median household income increased between 1989 and 1999, dis-
trict MCAS scores rose annually by just over a hundredth of a point between 1998
and 2000. (To put this in perspective, it is helpful to recall that on average, scores
rose by approximately 1.76 points a year, though, once again, the range of variation
was huge — running all the way from 2.8 to a negative 3.14).
The change in state aid is calculated as a difference of two percentages. The first
is the percentage of district actual total spending state aid represented in 1994; the
second is the same ratio for 2000. We subtract the former from the latter and em-
ploy the difference in our equation to estimate the effect of state aid. In almost all
districts, this difference is positive. The average increase is about 7% though the
range of variation runs from low negative rates to 34%. Our statistical inquiry, pre-
sented formally in Appendix 7, indicates that for each 1% this ratio crept up, MCAS
scores rose each year by approximately two hundredth (.02) of a point.69 No current
ethnic or racial variables, including the percentage of African-American students in
districts, appear to affect slopes of district-level improvements, nor did the absolute
level of per capita income.70
Since these results have large implications, some amplifying comments are in
order. First, just as before, we spent considerable time exploring alternative specifi-
cations. We checked to see if high percentages of other minority groups in districts,
such as Hispanics, or students with limited English, influenced the intercept and, of
course, whether ethnic or racial variables systematically affected the slope. Just as in
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the earlier case (and repeating all our earlier cautions about the potential pitfalls of
multicollinearity and levels of analysis71), we conclude that our data indicate they do
not — with one qualification. As discussed earlier, our data for ethnicity and race
come from data for schools released by the DOE. We do not have data for longer
run changes in these categories on par with that recently released by the U.S. Census
for towns. There are good reasons to be cautious about switching from data for
schools to town data, but we are currently exploring the use of data from the 2000
U.S. Census to study longer run demographic changes in districts. It is possible that
some demographic change in districts that affects scores may come to light as we
address this problem, though since our equation takes account of changes in income,
it probably catches the most prominent source of variation. We checked to see if
high percentages of other minority groups in districts, such as Hispanics, or other
variables influenced either the intercept or the slope. Because some other studies
have claimed to find impacts, we did employ data from the 2000 Census to test
whether changes in the percentages of individuals in poverty or single parent fami-
lies between 1989 and 1999 affected changes in MCAS scores. They did not.72
In any case, it is important to note that by comparison with the vast differences in
district starting points, the (ameliorative) effects of state aid have thus far been quite
modest. As discussed in more detail in Appendix 7, a substantial amount of our
equation’s ability to predict change comes from specification of the intercepts. On
the other hand, in sharp contrast to previous studies, there is no doubt that the term
for state spending, along with the change in household income, significantly im-
proves the equation. And, of course, the effect applies broadly, to district grand
averages, rather than simply to one grade level.
The most challenging finding, however, was that if one attempted to predict ei-
ther the level of 1998 MCAS scores alone or the rate of improvement from 1998 to
1999 with an appropriately truncated version of the same state spending variable,
there was no effect. Indeed, on the most plausible specification, the effects of state
spending up to that point were negative.
After scrutinizing the data, we are confident that our findings for the entire pe-
riod are solid. They appear to reflect a real evolution in the state’s system for fi-
nancing education. In the last two years, the state substantially increased the flow of
funds to many more districts. The signs of modest positive effects appear when one
takes account of this data. The gradual emergence of these effects as state investment
widened and deepened may help explain why earlier analysts had such trouble find-
ing their traces — there were few, if any, to be found then. It also suggests that the
relation between spending and improvement is still evolving, perhaps rapidly. A
particularly intriguing implication is that rhetoric about “staying the course” has a
foundation in reality: For district performances to rise in response to the change
over six years in the percentage of Chapter 70 funds as a share of actual district
spending suggests that districts react to what they perceive as credible long run fi-
nancial developments, not year to year financial flows.
 But, of course, the result also raises other interesting questions: Did the blaze of
publicity that accompanied the advent of MCAS play any role in this process? Did
the mounting furor over the possibility that large numbers of students might eventu-
ally be denied a diploma move districts to more effective action? Did school boards
and superintendents perhaps not only have more money to spend, but also attend
more rigorously to how they spent their new resources once district scores went up
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in the lights? Or are the critics of MCAS right to fear that schools are simply learn-
ing to teach to the test?
For now, this latter seems an oversimplification. It is difficult, for example, to
think of any reason why districts should learn to teach to the test in proportion to the
shift in the amount of Chapter 70 aid they received over six years. No less impor-
tantly, Massachusetts scores also rose on the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), which is widely regarded as the best existing educational assess-
ment vehicle. It is true, however, that in other states where scores on “high stakes”
tests have risen through time, such as Texas, national test scores sometimes have
not.73 Particularly given the suspiciously large rise in MCAS scores in 2001, it will
be important to benchmark MCAS results against the NAEP data. If the NAEP data
begin to lag behind the MCAS results, then alarm bells should ring across the state.74
Conclusion: Securing Reform
Almost from the moment the final shots died away, the argument started over who
really won the battle of Borodino. Not surprisingly, Tolstoy, like many other Rus-
sians, was greatly impressed by the fact that “Napoleon’s generals, Davoust, Ney,
and Marat, who were close to the region of fire, and sometimes even rode into it,
several times led immense masses of orderly troops into that region. But instead of
what had invariably happened in all their previous battles, instead of hearing that the
enemy were in flight, the disciplined masses of troops came back in undisciplined,
panic-stricken crowds. They formed them in good order again, but their number was
steadily dwindling.” In fact, however, it was the Russians who finally had to with-
draw, after suffering over forty thousand casualties.
The struggle for education reform in Massachusetts is going much more smoothly
than Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. Our analysis of changes in MCAS scores –
which all pre-date the recent change in test scoring and thus are proof against chal-
lenge on those grounds – indicated that school district performance is truly improv-
ing and that the Commonwealth’s massive investments in K-12 education are at least
a small part of the reason why. Our cross-sectional analysis identified specific school
and district practices that appear to be related to superior performance, such as
higher superintendent salaries, higher teacher maximum salaries, and limits on ath-
letic budgets.75 Given the state’s continuing commitment to funding reform, there is
no obvious reason why such policies could not be more widely emulated. Indeed, we
found evidence that the great, cumulative disparities in income and other advantages
that demonstrably influence where districts start from might not pose insuperable
barriers to improvement even in heavily disadvantaged and minority districts. Our
efforts to measure the “value added” by district school systems also show how, if
there is a will to do so, MCAS data can be employed in far reaching ways that do
not automatically buttress the popular conclusion that the richest schools are the best
schools. Indeed, our estimates of value added indicate that some of the most affluent
districts in the state rank at the very bottom.
But the battle of Borodino still holds a powerful lesson for education policy in
the state of Massachusetts. With his supply lines overstretched and his army ex-
hausted, the French Emperor found himself unable to properly follow up as the tide
appeared to turn in his favor at the end of the day. This allowed the Russian army to
escape, ensuring that, though the battle was won, the war was “definitively lost.”76
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Massachusetts is now in the midst of a major fiscal transition. Slower economic
growth, the bursting of the stock market bubble, and a multi-stage tax cutting initia-
tive are all combining to squeeze state revenues. At the same time the federal educa-
tion act just signed into law mandates much wider (and more expensive) testing.
Napoleonic insight is not required to see that the state’s education reforms will in-
evitably come under increasing pressure at precisely the moment the evidence sug-
gests that the tide has turned.
Greater efficiency or superior information will not solve the problem. But espe-
cially as tests multiply under federal pressure, it is absurd for policymakers and the
public to rely on summaries of school district scores that are typically in error
thanks to easily remediable statistical mistakes. Nor, now that we have shown that
the data are spatially autocorrelated, can any public purpose be served by continuing
to argue policy in the newspapers or the legislature on the basis of studies that rely
on ordinary linear regressions, with no correction for spatial autocorrelation.
The most effective ways to follow up, however, will almost surely emerge from
closer analyses of what is being done with all the money and better targeting. Con-
sider, for example, the following sobering fact: Our study indicates clearly that
higher maximum salaries for teachers and superintendents enhance district perfor-
mance. With all the attention and money lavished on K-12 education in recent years,
one might, accordingly, suspect that salaries would have exploded. But this does not
appear to be true. We lack good time series data on either maximum teachers’ or
superintendents’ salaries. But the Department of Education has published data on
average teachers’ salaries by district. These are not ideal for constructing precise
estimates of statewide average teacher salaries, but they can be used to provide an
estimate of how average salaries have changed. The data indicate that average sala-
ries rose by about $1000 a year between 1993 and 1999. Using our estimated aver-
age salary for 1993 of approximately $37,415 as the base, this works out to an in-
crease of about 2.75% a year — not much more than the rate of inflation and about
half the rate at which average pay within the state rose over the same period. 77
When one examines the correlation between the increasing state aid received by
districts in this period and changes in average teacher salaries, a remarkable fact
emerges: Changes in school district Chapter 70 spending between 1993 and 1999
and changes in average teachers salaries over the same period are almost uncorre-
lated.78 Whatever districts spent their new monies on, it mostly was not higher
teacher salaries.79
It is easy to reel off other examples where intelligent targeting might make a big
difference and perhaps actually save money, by reducing wasted expenditures. In
developing our cross-sectional equation, for example, we examined whether some
ways school districts allocate expenditures among various categories, such as spend-
ing for teachers’ aides, or central office spending, influenced performance on
MCAS. In most cases we found no effects on test scores. It is true that a negative
result is not necessarily conclusive evidence that a particular form of spending is
irrelevant — some statistics, such as student/teacher ratios are thought to be so im-
portant that every district watches them closely, and thus little variation results. But
we are skeptical that this accounts for the apparent irrelevance of so many types of
expenditure. Inevitably, one wonders if district performance would improve if more
funds were consciously directed into forms of spending that demonstrably enhance
district performance.80 We suspect the answer is yes, but it is time to find out for
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sure. Considering the potential size of the effects, a closer look at spending on ath-
letics is also certainly in order.
Our evidence suggests that the high hopes that animated educational reform in the
state are actually being fulfilled, and to an extent that surprised us. But while it is
good to have a study that documents this, it would be even better if a variety of
other studies confirmed this judgment and perhaps amplified or qualified it. It is
particularly important to analyze data below the level of districts. Data at the school
level are desirable for such a follow up, but there is no reason why Massachusetts,
like other states, should not make individual level data, appropriately safeguarded to
protect privacy, available to researchers. Such data are particularly important for
fashioning better indices of how school performance changes from year to year — a
task that the new federally mandated test make more urgent.81 They are also the best
way to check the evidence at the district level that suggests that improvements in
scores are not systematically affected by minority status.
In the two years since we began this study, the state Department of Education has
greatly improved the amount and timeliness of the data it releases. But this paper’s
findings in regard to the salaries of school superintendents demonstrate that for all
the progress that has been made, we remain uncomfortably close to the situation of
the commanders at Borodino. We know the earth is shaking and vast movements are
in progress, but it is very difficult to discern what is really happening. To be sure
that, unlike Napoleon at Borodino, the initial successes of educational reform in
Massachusetts are properly pursued, the press, researchers, and the public need ac-
cess to far more data on both districts and schools.
It is time to require the Department of Education to gather and release on its
website in easily downloadable form not only superintendents’ salaries, but average
and maximum salaries for teachers and principals. The DOE should also have to
release its data in a form that permits meaningful evaluations. There is no excuse,
for example, for the Department to continue releasing some scores without indicat-
ing the number of students who took the test, so that proper weighted averages can
be constructed.82 Given recent evidence about the importance of institutional grading
patterns for student learning and performance, the state should also publish data on
grading patterns within schools and districts.83 Data on district investments in teacher
development would also be extremely helpful.
Here, however, there appears to be a disjunction between what the public plainly
desires and the current policy. In Massachusetts, the normal pattern of “populariza-
tion” in the best sense has broken down almost completely in regard to statistical
assessment and discussion of MCAS. A newspaper report about some of our findings
in regard to athletics and value added revealed many officials with responsibility for
setting policy in districts and in the state clearly were unfamiliar with the idea of
statistical controls or even the notion of “value added.” They seemed not to realize
that the aspirins they reached for as their constituents suddenly began inquiring
about value added, instead of raw scores, were tested in accord with essentially the
same statistical principles. The media also continue to report unweighted MCAS
averages, a practice that is uncomfortably reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland.
It is doubtful that the state can go on like this very much longer. DOE officials
have now begun to recommend that district school boards be held accountable for
continued low performance on MCAS. New federal legislation also requires districts
with underperforming schools to offer students transportation to better schools. Both
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of these practices raise pointed questions about proper standards for assessing school
and district performance.
Not every idea that has surfaced is equally promising. There has been talk of
concentrating oversight on districts that appear most in need of it and leaving largely
alone districts that appear to be performing acceptably. This may sound sensible, but
it is not: It almost certainly implies that affluent districts with high raw scores will
be awarded “get out of jail free” cards. Poor districts, especially small poor districts,
whose scores are most subject to random variation, will get hammered.
This would be doubly unfortunate. The Commonwealth has an obvious interest in
picking up performance in affluent districts with low value added. And there is no
point in wasting time and resources turning poor school districts upside down if
their central problem is that they are poor. To properly discharge its oversight role,
the DOE needs to move in the direction of a formal value added standard, probably
including measures that take account of score changes over time. The latter, how-
ever, will run headlong into all the concerns about randomness earlier discussed.
Unlike some critics of MCAS, we do not believe that these issues cannot be ratio-
nally approached or practically solved. Other states are already wrestling with these
questions and the new Bush education bill mandating sweeping testing programs
guarantees that they will soon move to a political front burner. If the state does not
do better than it has so far managed in its efforts to identify top performing districts,
the reaction is sure to be sharp.84
What will assuredly destroy prospects for continued progress is the impression
that DOE is working out its standards behind closed doors, with no public debates
and no serious discussion in the media. Because the Department is subject to so
much mistaken criticism, it is easy to understand why it often appears to adopt a
policy of simply ignoring critics.85 But this is sure to undermine public confidence
in the long run. In the case of standards for replacing school boards or closing char-
ter schools, it is also guaranteed to produce a bitter backlash, as losers discover the
arbitrariness inherent in poorly formulated standards adopted without widespread
public understanding of what they really entail. Think, for example, of what will
happen when a school board or charter school discovers that properly weighted aver-
ages would show that its performance was actually better than, say, a dozen other
school districts – something that, while infrequent, actually occurs in the data of this
study. If for no other reason, the certainty of future lawsuits should motivate state
and local officials to look long and carefully at the likely consequences of settling
on a standard. But there is also a better reason to encourage wider public discussion
of the tests: the likely result would be a broad refocusing of attention and debate on
what actually works to boost student performance, and consolidation of the progress
that our data appear to signal.z
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Notes
1. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Constance Garnett (New York: Modern Li-
brary, 1994). A verst, by the way, is an old Russian measure of distance, about
two-thirds of a mile.
2. The MERA was enacted in 1993.
3. Thomas J. Kane, David Dvorin, and Rachel Deyette, An Update on School Reform
in Massachusetts (Paper presented at the Conference on Education Reform, Gor-
don Public Policy Center, Brandeis University, March 9, 2000); Robert Gaudet,
Effective School Districts in Massachusetts: A Study of Student Performance on
the 1999 MCAS Assessments, (Boston: Donahue Institute, 2000); see also
Jordana Hart, Study Measures Impact of Demographic Factors on School Perfor-
mance, Boston Globe, January 14, 1999, B1.
4. For a very interesting analysis of the types of errors made by students in the Bos-
ton school system, see Lisa Gonsalves, Learning From the MCAS Exam: An
Analysis of Boston Public High School Student Responses, University of Massa-
chusetts, Boston, 2001, photocopy.
5. For the link between home prices and school quality assessments, see David Figlio
and Maurice Lucas, Whats in a Grade? School Report Cards and House Prices,
(Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000). Their data are for
Florida, but we have no doubt that a similar study for Massachusetts would pro-
duce analogous results.
6. In the wake of a Boston Globe column by Scott Lehigh, March 1, 2002, A17, that
reported on some of our results, some DOE officials briefly suggested that because
the tests were not yet required for graduation, some students may not have taken
them seriously. The inference was that rankings based on the results would not be
valid, since the students were not putting forth their best efforts. But this objec-
tion confuses random with systematic disturbing factors. Only the latter present
any problems. Unless one believes that students in certain districts are somehow
more susceptible to this problem than others, there is no reason to be particularly
concerned. Everyone took the test under the same conditions. There is also the
obvious fact that the tests are clearly being taken extremely seriously, indeed so
seriously that threatened boycotts by opponents have dwindled almost to nullity.
7. Spatial statistics as a field has developed rapidly, but it is not widely appreciated
within general econometrics or statistics. See, e.g., Noel Cressie, Statistics for
Spatial Data, (Revised ed.; New York: Wiley, 1993) or A.D Cliff and J.K Ord,
Spatial Processes: Models and Applications (London: Pion Limited, 1981). A re-
cent helpful applied discussion is Daniel A. Griffth and Carl G. Amrhein, Multivari-
ate Statistical Analysis for Geographers (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1997). In the closing stages of our work on this paper, we finally did encounter
work on school test scores that treated them spatially. See Edward B. Reeves and
Harold Harty, Regional Disparities in Kentucky Academic Index Scores,
(Morehead, Ky: Morehead State University, 1998) and Timothy Pitts and Edward
B. Reeves, A Spatial Analysis of Contextual Effects on Educational Accountability
in Kentucky, (Morehead, Kentucky: Morehead State, 1999).
8. There is now a large literature on GIS systems; see, e.g., Paul Longley and
Michael Batty, Spatial Analysis: Modeling in a GIS Environment (Cambridge:
GeoInformation International, 1996).
9. Test administration is evolving rapidly. The changes, however, can be followed
conveniently at either the DOEs website or that of the Boston Globe; thus we do
not attempt to trace them here. It suffices to observe that early public discussions
centered on the three tests we analyze here: English, math, science; and that
these were administered as discussed. In 1999, the Department of Education in-
troduced a test in history and social science. In 2001, the DOE decided to give
the test in that area, along with the science test, to grade 5 pupils. Some English
and math tests have also been moved to different grade levels and some tests
have become more specifically focused.
109
School District Performance Under the MCAS
10. Compare Gaudet, 1999 MCAS, or Kane, Dvorin, and Deyette, School Reform.
11. Ambiguity arises because one adds one district by combining those that then dis-
appear into the portmanteau district. Note that many of these districts enroll rela-
tively few children, so that student coverage figures look better than they are.
Since as mentioned below, results of the various tests are highly, but imperfectly,
correlated with one another, simply dropping a grade level might also raise addi-
tional questions about the comparability of aggregate scores.
12. Not all variables require re-weighting. Following the logic of district consolidation,
the most reasonable way to register maximum faculty salaries, for example, is
simply to record the highest level in the system; the same holds for
superintendents salary, where there is more than one superintendent. In all cases
known to us, the district with the high school dominates such accounts.   In the
lists of districts in the Appendices, the consolidated districts necessarily are de-
nominated by the names of only one of their components. The particular name we
chose has no significance; any name worked, as long as there was but one. The
consequence is that someone who lives in one of the other component districts
can identify his or her districts proper scores by locating the name of the one
component that is in our lists. The DOE website has a useful guide to districts
where one can readily find the names of the others.
13. This problem has received much discussion within educational statistics since the
appearance of the famous Coleman Report. See, e.g., Christopher Achen, The
Statistical Analysis of Quasi-Experiments (Berkeley: University of California,
1986). We are not overwhelmed, however, by claims that modeling the assign-
ment problem slips past this conundrum. In many cases, the chances of mistak-
enly characterizing the assignment process are at least as high as going wrong
from incorrectly modeling the original problem.
14. The problem of multicollinearity is discussed in virtually all treatments of regres-
sion analysis. A particularly lucid account, with many suggestions for analysis and
treatment, is Stanton Glantz and Bryan Slinker, Primer of Applied Regression &
Analysis of Variance (Revised ed.; New York: McGraw Hill, 2001). Separate
tables breaking out scores by race and gender can be found on the Department of
Education website. Since the tables can be sorted by district or school, one might
reply that a partial correction is built in. It is true that a comparison of, say, New-
ton with Chelsea, would control for some factors influencing the scores. But this
comparison of a very rich district with a very poor one really begs all the impor-
tant questions, as is obvious from our cross-sectional equation below. Less glaring
contrasts will be largely unrevealing.
15. The existing corrections for different price levels appear to be based on wages in
individual towns, plus an allowance for areas with below-average wages. The lat-
ter is about redistribution, not price correction. See the discussion in Proposed
Changes to Chapter 70, a working draft available on the DOE website at http://
finance1.doe.mass.edu/chapter70/c70_proposals.html. We are currently studying
price indices based on a wider labor market study that the state also commis-
sioned. Better price indices should improve our models fit; we expect to publish
on this in the near future.
16. Thus we have only a little to say in this paper about how various ethnic groups
fare across districts and our discussion below of factors influencing changes in
test scores needs to be read with this qualification. To profitably attack this prob-
lem, individual level data would be very helpful. For a good general discussion of
the problems of this sort, see Christopher  Achen and W. Phillips Shively, Cross-
Level Inference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
17. See, e.g., Anthony Bryk and Stephen Raudenbush, Hierarchical Linear Models
(London: Sage, 1992) or Tom Snijders and Roel Bosker, Multilevel Analysis (Lon-
don: Sage, 1999).
18. The data on superintendents salaries are inevitably fairly noisy.  Most of our fig-
ures came from The Massachusetts Bay Cooperative Data Study Report for 1998,
published by the CO/OP, Inc., then in Waltham; the rest we gathered directly
from districts. Noise in the data comes from two main sources. First, many dis-
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tricts pay varying parts of superintendent health insurance premiums and other
benefits, including travel allowances, which are not reflected in our figures. Sec-
ond, though the fact that the lions share of our data came from one source is
somewhat reassuring, absent detailed knowledge about how each district reports
the salary, there may be differences in the meaning of 1998 as between fiscal
and calendar years. The consistency of our results suggests that such concerns
should not be overblown, but they require noting here.
Our analysis of changes in test scores later in this paper is shadowed by the
great cost of calculating change over time in school demographic and other data.
As we discuss below, some of our data comes from the 1990 U.S. Census. Be-
tween 1990 and 2000, one can only make estimates of changes over five or six
years. More importantly, however, many of our key school social variables come
from published DOE data. While we inputted a full set of this data by hand for one
year, doing much more than this calls for more resources than we had. Data on
changing district enrollments is available and we did examine it, though without
finding much of interest. Our hierarchical model of change also employs data from
the 2000 US Census, downloaded from the Boston.com website.
19. See David Figlio and Maurice Lucas, Do High Grading Standards Affect Student
Performance? (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000).
20. See, e.g., the discussion in the Boston Globe, Feb. 25, 2000, which reports on
the controversy occasioned by an article in Boston Magazine. The cases involve
particular schools, where the exam allegedly either leaked, students were allowed
to revise answers, or other improprieties.  Several analysts, notably, Stephen
Klein and Laura Hamilton, Large-Scale Testing Current Practices and New Direc-
tions, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999) have suggested that this problem is much
more important than commonly realized. As discussed below, we fear their con-
cerns are warranted in regard to the MCAS and that the problem is becoming
much larger than policymakers or school officials want to realize.
21. Tolstoy, War and Peace, 912. Alistair Horne, How Far from Austerlitz? (New
York: St. Martins, 1996) highly esteems Tolstoys account of Borodino. One
might wonder, but it makes no difference for our points here.
22. We have made no use of the tests for History and Social Science in our analyses
in this paper, save in Appendix 2, which illustrates how inclusion of the test af-
fects district grand averages in 2001. This is not because we doubt the impor-
tance of historical knowledge  on the contrary, we think historical thinking is
fundamental to all serious reflection about society and human beings. But the his-
tory of this test is complicated and its coverage is still evolving. See, e.g., the
Boston Globe, July 24, 2001, B1. This quotes a member of the State Board of
Education as suggesting that Its more important to know who Thomas Jefferson
was than to know about the Ming Dynasty. Its a question of priorities. In a
twelve-year curriculum, it is difficult to believe the choice is really this stark. We
cannot help recalling the ringing words of the legendary  and surely apocryphal
 campaign speech of the late Senator Hubert Humphrey: My friends, I tell you
that we do not have to choose between jobs and pollution  we can have both!
23. Aggregating results of separate tests into one overall score is very widespread and
deeply engrained in the case of MCAS, as with other tests, among both the gen-
eral public and scholarly researchers. But the step can be more problematic than
usually recognized. We examined correlation matrices for all the tests in a given
year to see how closely the various scores moved. A pattern is quite general that
can be predicted from the box plots in Figure 3, below: Since fourth grade scores
are on average slightly higher, and tenth grade scores lower, with eighth grade
scores in between, within grade correlations are extremely high  almost always
well over .90. Correlations of eighth grade tests with fourth grade tests (or the
tenth grade tests) run slightly lower  usually in the high eighties. Correlations
between tests in the most distant grade levels  4 and 10  run in the low
eighties or seventies. This suggests to us that while the MCAS lies within the em-
pirical bounds of many tests that are actually administered, efforts to study each
test and grade level separately might also be rewarding. Cf., for example, the dis-
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cussion of math and language tests in Thomas J. Kane and Douglas Staiger, Im-
proving School Accountability Measures, (Cambridge: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 2001). We regard such studies as an obvious next step in re-
search on MCAS.
24. Some students become ill; a few perhaps move between tests. But see below on
other, potentially less innocent reasons for this variation, which must surely re-
quire careful monitoring in the future.
25. Formally, let Yijt and nijt,  i = grade 4,8, and 10, j = subject of MCAS of Math-
ematics, English, and Science, and t = year of taking MCAS, 1998, 1999, 2000,
be the test scores and number of students who took MCAS of grade i, subject j,
and year t respectively. The Globe simply added the test scores as:
GLOBE = 3  3Y
i,j
i=4,8,10 j=M,E,S
But the grand average of 3 grades, 3 subjects, and over three years is:
GRADAV890 = i=4,8,10 j=M,E,S














3   3  3n
ijk
GRADAVt =
and average for year t is:
26. As explained above, we do not make use of the test for History and Social Sci-
ence. Administration of this test began only in 1999; after that date differences
between our results and some published rankings will result not only from the
method of calculating grand averages, but whether or not they also include this
test. Properly weighted averages for the newly released 2002 MCAS scores are
available on the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs website at
www.mccormack.umb.edu.
27. Jordana Hart, In Harvard, Success Follows Success, Boston Globe, December 8,
1999, C1.
28. For a description of the MCAS data reported by the DOE, see the Departments
The Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System: Guide to Interpreting the
2000 MCAS Reports for Schools and Districts, available on the DOE website.
29. Richardson cites an unpublished report by Theodore Micceri, entitled The Uni-
corn, the Normal Curve, and Other Improbable Creatures. This examined distribu-
tions of scores on over 400 tests given in schools, universities, and workplaces
across the United States. None of the distributions were normally shaped. Cf.,
Ken Richardson, The Making of Intelligence (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2000), 35.
30. What one finally thinks on this question will turn at least in part on ones attitude
toward so-called normed vs. criterion tests. The latter purport to assess based
on some external standard; the former compare students among themselves.
Newspaper reports of high failure rates in tests of historical knowledge or English
grammar often turn out to involve criterion tests, in which students are assessed
according to some standard that is presumed appropriate.
31. The premise of this paper is obviously that school districts target high scores.
Given the focus in the media and the spillover effects on housing prices and other
features of districts, we are convinced this premise is sensible. But we did con-
sider the possibility that districts might try to minimize the number of outright
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failures. We stopped worrying about this when we discovered that the correlation
between rises in grand averages and declines in failures is a near perfect nega-
tive 98.5%. (The correlation is of course negative, since the rise of one implies
the others fall.)
32. Nearly all of our cross-sectional data on school districts, including the ethnic
composition of enrolled students, came from the bound version of the Department
of Educations School District Profiles, Vol. 1: 1997-1998 School Year and Vol.
2: Foundation Budget Spending Comparisons Fiscal Year 1997. The Department
of Education has since made available a great deal of additional data on its
website. We also use some of this data selectively, since it is usually the only
available source of time series data on, for example, average teachers salaries.
(The variable, maximum teachers salaries, which turns out to be more useful, is
as far as we know only available from the bound volume, which does not, how-
ever, record average salaries.) Where it was necessary to weight district data
we made a point of using statistics (such as enrollments) from the bound volume
as far as possible, so that our cross-sectional data are internally consistent.
Political data came from the relevant State of Massachusetts websites (that
for the General Court [the Legislature] and the Secretary of State). Some school
districts are located in more than one legislative district; we took account of this
by turning variables such as Democrat or Republican into continuous vari-
ables, so that a district could be fractionally one or the other. Other demographic
variables not included in the DOE bound volumes, such as the percentage of two
parent families, were calculated from U.S. Census data, mostly for 1990, down-
loaded from the Mass CHIP website. Figures for recipients of Transitional Assis-
tance are state figures for 1998, also from that website. We turned the raw
numbers into percentages using MISER town population estimates for 1997.
33. One inevitably asks about the reliability of all this data. Our view is that despite
some publicized lapses, most is of reasonably high quality. As indicated below,
we have some questions about the limited English category. It may be worth
observing, however, that this variable always needs to be tested in teasing out
multicollinearity problems; often adding it with an ethnic variable produces a re-
sult suggesting that what appears to be centrally a demographic question is really
a language issue. While these issues are always associated, only confusion re-
sults if they are confounded.
34. The literature is huge; we do not believe evidence about gaps in any school tests
in one country is very relevant to the general question. For that, one needs cross-
cultural and over time evidence; see e.g., Gary Collier, Social Origins of Mental
Ability (New York: Wiley, 1994).
35. For the use of cultural-historical here, see, e.g., Laboratory of Comparative Hu-
man Cognition, ed., Culture and Cognitive Development, 4 ed., Vol. I, Handbook
of Child Psychology (New York: Wiley, 1983) or James V. Wertsch, Voices of
the Mind: A Sociocultural Approach to Mediated Action (Cambridge: Harvard
Univesity Press, 1991).
36. As noted above, we examined DOE statistical reports on actual school popula-
tions; we did not rely on U.S. Census data for the population as a whole in this
part of our investigation.
37. Daniel Farber and Eric Krieg, Unequal Exposure to Ecological Hazards: Environ-
mental Injustices in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (Boston: Northeastern
University Philanthropy and Environmental Justice Research Project, 2001).
38. See Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition
and the Logic  of Money-Driven Political Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995), especially the Appendix, for a discussion of weaknesses in conven-
tional accounts of party competition.
39. We did dismiss a few cases where an apparent crank candidacy garnered
scarcely any votes; though in theory these could present difficult cases of judg-
ment, empirically they are easily distinguished from serious minor party candi-
dates.
40. It may well mean that sample size matters; and it is not too surprising if 1998
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and 1999 bear weak relations to an election in 2000, given the negative results
for the 1998 election.
41. Construction expenditures are not included in this data. They are separately bud-
geted. A former school board member who read a draft of this study commented
to us that, indeed, his board had in fact used this category as a general reserve
fund. No question of fraud was involved; but the funds were employed where they
were needed. Certainly any accounting system will require some such reserve
system whether or not there are provisions for them.
42. A former school administrator who read a draft of this study commented that
some districts may spend still more on sports than is reflected in the budget data
we use. He instances two possibilities: user fees and arrangements by which
towns might allow school athletic programs to keep all or part of the gate from
major spectator sports. Neither he nor we are clear about whether such expendi-
tures would show in the state data we rely upon. Note that user fees would be
strongly correlated with town income; the impact of the other avenue is harder to
assess. These points underscore our remarks made below, that further research is
imperative before anything is done.  One might respond that the one general who
indubitably bested Napoleon ascribed his victory to the playing fields of Eton. Any
assessment of the role of sports in school will certainly want to consider this type
of issue. But it is also important to know if tumescent sports budgets are corre-
lated with other phenomena, such as larger differences between genders on math
scores. We are currently investigating this possibility.
Consider also the potential implications of our findings for the debate over
charter schools. Our observation is that few of these have major sports programs.
Other things being equal (which they surely are not), this might well facilitate a
focus on academics that leads to higher test scores. One might also wonder if
many issues about unionization that the national literature on school performance
has concentrated on would not look very different if a major, previously unmea-
sured variable received due consideration. But more of this another time.
43. This is not a guess; it is obvious in the datas restricted range of variation. School
boards are also clear that this ratio is watched closely.
44. It does not appear that districts apply a uniform standard in classifying students as
possessing limited English skills. This question deserves much more attention than
it has so far received.  Some data we examined, indeed, raised questions about
whether results for some districts could be skewed by such variations.
45. See Susan Aud, Competition in Education: A 1999 Update of School Choice in
Massachusetts, (Boston: Pioneer Institute, 1999); we drew on both DOE data and
data from Auds study (which also relied on DOE data) in our analysis here.
46. Eileen McNamara, Hard Sell Fails Test, Boston Globe, February 28, 2001, B1.
47. See the discussion in Klein and Hamilton, Large-Scale Testing.
48. The test claims to assess skills, not aptitude or intelligence. Though the distinc-
tion is popular, it may amount to less than is often claimed.  One reviewer of this
manuscript commented to us that he believes that the evidence supports the con-
tention that students who do well on the one type of test also score highly on the
other. Claims that MCAS measures achieved levels of skill have been challenged
recently. See Walt Haney, Lake Woebeguaranteed: Misuse of Test Scores in
Massachusetts, Part I, Education Policy Analysis Archives 10: 24 (2002). This is
available on the internet at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v10n24/. The argument is
somewhat difficult to resolve, since the test also attempts to sort students into
various categories, such as proficient, etc. But it would help if the Department
of Education would reply to serious criticism, instead of simply trying to ignore
critics, which must inevitably fan suspicions that it is not quite up to the argu-
ment. See the discussion below.
49. It may be that some effects that critics attribute to teachers unions or school bu-
reaucracy are in fact consequences of pressures for big athletic programs. None of
the studies we have seen that advance such arguments contain measures of the
weight accorded to athletics by schools.
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50. Appendix 5 also includes the number of exams taken by students; this is not to be
confused with the absolute number of students, since most students take more
than one exam. The larger the number, the more confidence one can have in the
results. We also computed the residual using a Bayesian approach. This yields vir-
tually the same results. We are currently at work on a paper comparing the two
approaches to school test score comparisons in detail and so will not develop this
theme further here.
51. Ceiling effects (if they exist) reflect the fact that the highest scoring districts
are thought to be pushing the envelope of available techniques, so that additional
large gains in scores would be unlikely. But it is instructive to compare districts
such as Wayland, Wellesley, Weston, and Dover-Sherborn in our Table 5. These
very affluent districts share many economic and demographic characteristics, and
they are geographically adjacent. Yet their rankings in regard to value added differ
substantially. They are not all walking on top of an invisible ceiling on the fron-
tiers of achievement. Here is a classic instance where an absence of statistical
controls leads to major misjudgments in everyday perception.
52. Jonathan Guryan, Does Money Matter? Regression-Discontinuity Estimates from
Education Finance Reform in Massachusetts, (Cambridge: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 2001).
53. Kane and Staiger, Measures.
54. Donald T. Campbell and David A. Kenny, A Primer on Regression Artifacts (New
York: Guilford Press, 1999). On the long controversy, see also Linda Collins and
John Horn, Best Methods for the Analysis of Change (Washington: American Psy-
chological Association, 1991) and Frederic Lord, Elementary Models for Measur-
ing Change, in Problems in Measuring Change, ed. Chester Harris (Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1963). A very interesting treatment of many issues is
David Rogosa, Myths of Longitudinal Research, www.stanford.edu/class351/
longit2k/myths.txt.
55. See Kane and Staiger, Measures. Cf. also the Boston Globes characterization of
schools that showed big improvements in 1999: a hodgepodge of tiny towns,
charter schools, and small cities sprinkled across the state. All of these entities
are much smaller than most school districts. The article appeared on December 8,
1999, front page.
56. See, in particular, Stephen W. Raudenbush, Comparing Personal Trajectories and
Drawing Causal Inferences From Longitudinal Data, in Annual Review of Psychol-
ogy, 2001, ed. S. T. Fiske, D. L. Schachter, and C. Zahn-Waxler (Palo Alto: An-
nual Reviews, 2001), 516-523.
57. Stephen Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models (2nd ed.;
London: Sage Publications, 2002), 166.
58. As we go to press, the Beacon Hill Institute (BHI) at Suffolk University has issued
a report, Getting Less for More: Lessons in Massachusetts Education Reform, in
which data from only two points in time are central to most of the analysis. Sev-
eral of its claims require careful scrutiny.
We have two fundamental methodological objections. The Department of Edu-
cation plainly warned that various changes in scoring and other features rendered
MCAS results for 2001 incomparable with those for 1998, 1999, and 2000. Ig-
noring recent literature on measuring change, the BHI makes no use of the three
years of data that are widely agreed to be comparable; instead, it takes the suspi-
ciously high 2001 data as one of its two comparison points. The other time point
it chose does not come from MCAS data at all - the report plucks it from the old,
low-stakes Massachusetts Educational Assessment Program (MEAP) for 1994.
This is not a happy choice. In the terminology of Raudenbush, discussed above,
the fundamental problem is to get as good a fix as possible on the trajectories of
the various school districts as they implement educational reform. It is obvious
that the reliability of the trajectories one estimates will be greatly affected by
how many data points one employs: The more, the better, always assuming the
points reflect comparable measures. Estimates from two points cannot possibly be
as reliable as efforts that make use as much data as possible. Omitting the three
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most reliably comparable data points and using an entirely different test as a
baseline can only engender confusion.
There is a substantial literature on equating different tests; see e.g., Robert L.
Linn, Linking Results of Distinct Assessments, Applied Measurement in Educa-
tion 6 (1), 83-102. The conditions for doing so are quite demanding. One needs to
be sure that the same constructs are being measured, with the same reliability.
The low stakes MEAP was a shorter test (and thus inevitably less reliable), which
did not report results for individual students. It did not reflect a statewide curricu-
lum framework, nor was it accompanied by insistent pressure on ESL and disabled
students to participate fully. Considering that statisticians have been unable to
agree on a uniform system for equating even well-understood tests such as the
SAT and the ACT (see Linn, Results, 89) because they measure different con-
structs, it is unlikely that a mix of MEAP and MCAS constitutes a good bench-
mark. We doubt that even the lower requirement for calibration, in Linns sense,
is clearly met. The BHI study actually relies upon rankings based on percentiles.
These can always be mechanically generated, whether or not comparisons make
sense. In any case, correlated errors (in Raudenbushs sense, above), regression to
the mean, and other regression artifacts described by Campbell and Kenny, may
well shadow comparisons from just two data points. The BHI probably does not
help itself by foreswearing average scores and sorting outcomes into the categori-
cal boxes in which the DOE sorts students (Warning/Failure, Needs Improve-
ment, etc.), and grouping schools by the 1994 test score (previous perfor-
mance). We earlier observed that changes in the DOE category of warning/fail-
ure track changes in grand averages almost perfectly. Adding boxes almost surely
enhances the chances of finding spurious changes, while sorting by track records
may easily increase the incidence of what Campbell and Kenny term regression
artifacts due to extreme group selection. For these reasons alone, we would be
suspicious of the BHI claims about class sizes, even if our data (for a single point
in the nineties) did not suggest that variation in these ratios has been exceedingly
limited and, perhaps (as the BHI report notes), mis-measured.
Second, the BHI report suffers from serious - indeed, we suspect, fatal - omit-
ted variable problems. It never estimates the impact of ethnic variables, or ESL,
though both our equations and common sense indicate that several such factors in-
fluence MCAS scores; and it buries athletic spending in broader categories that
muffle its impact. In the absence of proper controls, results for the variables the
BHI does test are necessarily suspect. The failure to run any tests for spatial
autocorrelation inevitably raises additional question marks about many of its esti-
mates.
Happily, our dataset permits a direct test of the BHI studys claim that higher
average teacher salaries lower MCAS scores. In our change equation described in
Appendix 7, average teacher salaries become a Level 2 variable. We have run the
test and its results are not significant (though, in contrast to the BHIs claim, the
term is positive, not negative). This is hardly a surprise - as discussed previously,
districts have imperfect control over average teacher salaries, which are probably
a function of the balance of incoming and retiring teachers, as much as collective
bargaining settlements. By contrast, districts have more direct control over maxi-
mum teachers salaries, and this variable shows powerfully in several of our equa-
tions. But the BHI did not think to test this variable and we do not have data on
changes in maximum salaries over the nineties to run a test ourselves. As dis-
cussed below, it is also clear that most districts have not raised teacher salaries
that much. Changes in district household income and state aid are far more telling
in influencing changes in MCAS scores.
We have other doubts about the BHI report: Nowhere does it attempt a direct
test of the effects of state aid on MCAS scores. Neither does the report provide
direct evidence about the importance of charter schools. The only variable the BHI
study actually estimates in regard to choice is changes in percentages of stu-
dents in public schools. But as we observed earlier, this is an ambiguous indicator,
which may mean either that the school system is very good or that affordable al-
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ternatives are sparse. No less importantly, changes in the ratio may have little
to do with choice. For example, financial pressures on Catholic schools can
affect the percentage of students in public schools and may reflect district per
capita income, declines in religious vocations, and other extraneous factors. We
are not uncritical partisans of public schools - one of us once joined with the
French consul in an unsuccessful bid to establish a bilingual charter school super-
vised not only by the DOE, but the French Ministry of Education. But the failure
of our own direct tests of the impact of charter schools (described above)
makes us skeptical about their significance, at least so far. We are not surprised
that, as this essay goes to press, stock in the best known private company in
the business of running schools is selling for less than a dollar a share.
Given the problems inherent in assessments of change, we believe it is vital
that researchers present full-length cross-sectional equations and derive their ba-
sic measures of value added from these, as we have. Cross-sectional studies
are far more straightforward to interpret and can serve as a valuable check on
findings from studies of change. We also believe that multicollinearity is a par-
ticular problem in analyzing dropout rates, which is why we have little to say
about them in this paper.
59. The literature on this topic is too large to be inventoried here. The debate is
perhaps most conveniently followed in articles that are currently available on
the web, c.f., David Grissmer, Ana Flanagan, and Stephanie Williamson, Does
Money Matter for Minority and Disadvantaged Children? Assessing the New Em-
pirical Evidence, (Santa Monica: Rand, 1996); Eric Hanushek, Have We
Learned Anything New? The Rand Study of NAEP Performance, (Stanford:
Hoover Institution, 2001).
60. On multi-level models, standard sources include Bryk and Raudenbush, Hierar-
chical; Snijders and Bosker, Multilevel; and Harvey Goldstein, Multilevel Statis-
tical Models (2nd ed; London: Edward Arnold, 1995). Also very helpful are Ita
Kreft and Jan de Leeuw, Introducing Multilevel Modeling (London: Sage, 1998);
Ronald Heck and Scott Thomas, An Introduction to Multilevel Modeling Tech-
niques (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000); and Kelvyn Jones and Craig
Duncan, People and Places: The Multilevel Model as a General Framework for
the Quantitative Analysis of Geographical Data, in Spatial Analysis: Modeling in
a GIS Environment, ed. Paul Longley and Michael Batty (Cambridge:
GeoInformation International, 1996).
Our own discussion draws heavily on John B. Willett, Measuring Change:
What Individual Growth Modeling Buys You, in Change and Development: Is-
sues of Theory, Method, and Application, ed. Eric Amsel and K. Ann Renninger
(Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997), 213-43.  See also Margaret
Burchinal and Mark Applebaum, Estimating Individual Development Functions:
Methods and Their Assumptions, Child Development 62, No. 1 (1991), 23-43.
We have also profited from several draft chapters of a work in progress by
James Ware, especially Chapter 3. Single Group Repeated Measures Design.
61. This figure is loosely inspired by John B. Willett, Questions and Answers in the
Measurement of Change, in Review of Research in Education 15, ed. Ernst
Rothkopf (Washington: American Educational Research Association, 1991), 345-
422; and David Rogosa, David Brandt, and Michele Zimowski, A Growth Curve
Approach to the Measurement of Change, Psychological Bulletin 92, No. 3
(1982), 726-48.
62. The Table in the Appendix includes the number exams taken by students. For a
particular district, the higher the number, the more confidence one can have in
the particular figure.
63. See the discussion in Kane, Dvorin, and Deyette, School Reform. From ap-
proximately 1989 to the mid-nineties, the state was in fact, getting less for
less.
64. Note, however, that our regression results indicate that average scores in dis-
tricts that spent more than 100% of the state foundation budget were higher.
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The implication is that the 100% target is simply a specified minimum, not a
guarantee of some peculiarly advantaged status.
65. See in particular the discussion in Kreft and de Leeuw, Introducing, 82ff. Note
that the first level models are often estimated via an empirical Bayes procedures.
In our data none of this matters very much.
66. One near-miss may be of interest. Athletic spending came very close to attaining
an acceptable level of statistical significance in defining the intercept (.11). Some
analysts, indeed, might have taken it over. We prefer caution, but mention the
point.
67. Note that, as usual, the Census figures for towns have to be combined and prop-
erly weighted to yield statistics for school districts.
68. For the increasing polarization of incomes, see, e.g., Kevin Phillips, Wealth and
Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich (New York: Broadway
Books, 2002) and the review by Thomas Ferguson, Following the Money, Wash-
ington Post Book World 32, No. 20 (2002), 7.
69. This effect is not huge, as we have several times emphasized, and the change of
a percent in budgetary terms is a fair amount of money. But the effect is unam-
biguously positive and, as explained shortly, there are reasons to suspect that it
may be increasing. Note, however, that the large rise in test scores in 2001 cer-
tainly reflects other factors in addition to broader state spending.
70. Reckoned on the basis of the figures used in the cross-sectional model above, not
changes in any of these percentages over the nineties. We doubt that most of
these would matter very much, for reasons discussed immediately below.
71. Especially the level of analysis. We cannot stress too strongly that results at the
level of schools could differ from our findings for districts, particularly in regard to
the possible influence of social and ethnic variables.
72. The data for Massachusetts towns came from the Massachusetts Institute of So-
cial and Economic Research. We are grateful to Dr. Stephen Coelen, the Director,
for making these data available to us. The change in single parent families came
moderately close to attaining statistical significance. It did not, however, reach
even .15, which is considerably below the levels we have accepted in the rest of
our study. Note that other measures of poverty, especially ones internal to the
school rather than towns, might give different results.
73. See the discussion in Stephen Klein et al., What Do Test Scores in Texas Tell
Us? (Santa Monica: Rand, 2000).
74. See Brian Stecher and Laura S. Hamilton, Putting Theory to the Test, Rand Re-
view 26, No. 1 (Spring 2002), 20-21. Note that MCAS scores did not rise in the
second year of the test, contrary to the pattern in other states discussed in this ar-
ticle.
75. If, as we suspect, athletic budgets reflect the underlying values of the school sys-
tem, then simply capping expenditures would accomplish little.
76. The quotation is from Charles Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon (London: Longman,
1995), 259.
77. Our figures for average teachers salaries come from the DOE website and, inci-
dentally, appear to be the same as those used by other studies. But state-wide av-
erages calculated from this data are only approximations, since the website does
not show the number of teachers. Note, however, that we are mostly interested
in the changes between the numbers. The United States Statistical Abstract,
1996, 425, reports average annual pay for 1993 in Massachusetts was
$30,229. The corresponding figure for 1999 is currently on the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics website. It is $40,352. It may also be noted that state average
pay in 2000 rose to $44,326. We do not have the figures for teachers salaries
for 2000. Note that these figures are averages, and thus are probably pulled up by
high values at the top of the income scale. Figures for median state pay, if we
had them, might indicate that the raises received by most of the Commonwealths
citizens were more closely aligned with those received by teachers.
78. A simple spatial regression of changes in teachers salaries between 1994 and
1999 on changes in district Chapter 70 spending over the same period shows a
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coefficient of .04 times the change in Chapter 70 spending measured in thousands
of dollars. The significance level is .09.
79. The question of a possible salary cap for teachers apparently exercised the Massa-
chusetts House in the early stages of educational reform in Massachusetts. See
the discussion in Craig Bolon, Educational Reform in Massachusetts, August 30,
2000; available on the web at http://www.massparents.org/easternmass/
brookline/ed_reform_bolon.htm  In light of our results for the effect of teacher
maximum salaries on MCAS performance, it is fortunate this proposal was eventu-
ally withdrawn. Note that the discussion is about raises. Districts could, and cer-
tainly often did, also hire more teachers.
80. Many important categories of spending are too indirectly reflected in existing fig-
ures to be tested at all. Certainly there are no figures for such important school
functions as after-school programs or arts and music. Recent work on local gov-
ernment responses to budget cutbacks suggests some unsettling possibilities about
how school districts might be tempted simply to cut such apparently peripheral
programs in times of budget stringency. In the absence of better statistical infor-
mation about how schools respond, outcomes that make little sense in either the
long or short run can happen as a result of temporary budget crises. See the
sometimes chilling discussion in David Figlio, What Might School Accountability
Do? National Bureau of Economic Research Reporter, Fall 2001.
81. The advantages of tracking the same students over time for purposes of evalua-
tion can scarcely be overestimated. This has been done by other states without
compromising privacy. See ibid.
82. On the DOE website, the main MCAS results normally come with the number of
students taking the test. But this is not true of, for example, its data for results by
gender.
83. See Julian Betts and Jeff Grogger, The Impact of Grading Standards on Student
Achievement, Educational Attainment, and Entry Level Earnings (Cambridge: Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 2000).
84. The lists have obvious problems with randomness.  See Anne Wheelock, School
Awards Programs and Accountability in Massachusetts: Misusing MCAS Scores to
Assess Quality, available on the web at the Fair Test website. Cf., also, Boston
Globe, June 26, 2002, B2. We would not, however, agree that with appropriate
techniques, MCAS scores cannot yield good evidence of school improvements. Ev-
erything depends on how one analyzes the data. It may be that a legislative over-
sight committee will have to compel DOE to do it right.
85. A case in point, perhaps, are some (not all) of the complaints about individual
questions. We are sympathetic to suggestions that existing practice is defective
and needs more attention. But it is not necessarily true that a few defective ques-
tions invalidate a test. One needs to know how many questions and, in particular,
whether everyone is equally likely to go wrong on them or not. The latter issue is
much more serious.
86. Cliff and Ord, Spatial Processes, 1981.
87. Cressie, Statistics for Spatial Data, 1993.
88. Stephen Raudenbush and Anthony Byrk, Hierarchial Linear Models, 2nd ed. (Lon-
don: Sage, 2002), 164.
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knaR LOOHCS 8991 9991 0002 00--89
1 DRAVRAH 74.542 39.442 73.642 06.542
2 ELSILRACDROCNOC 39.442 44.442 86.742 45.542
3 YELSELLEW 45.542 10.542 06.542 83.542
4 HGUOROBXOBNOTCA 86.442 09.442 33.642 23.542
5 NOTSEW 23.542 75.442 35.542 51.542
6 NOTGNIXEL 92.442 15.442 01.542 56.442
7 DLEIFDEM 13.442 99.342 91.442 61.442
8 NROBREHSREVOD 48.342 40.442 94.442 21.442
9 RETSEHCNIW 39.342 47.242 22.542 00.442
01 DNALYAW 86.242 85.342 55.542 69.342
11 TNOMLEB 23.342 00.342 44.542 59.342
21 NOTWEN 07.342 58.242 32.442 06.342
31 MAHDEEN 73.242 39.142 72.542 91.342
41 HGUOROBTSEW 26.142 10.242 75.442 67.242
51 YRUBDUSNLOCNIL 69.142 55.342 83.242 46.242
61 DOOWTSEW 21.242 91.242 32.342 35.242
71 NORAHS 99.242 22.242 61.242 54.242
91 DROFTSEW 88.042 46.042 21.542 03.242
91 OROBHTUOSOROBHTRON 83.242 28.042 67.342 03.242
02 REVODNA 44.142 08.142 16.342 92.242
12 DROFDEB 94.042 21.142 71.442 59.142
22 TESSAHOC 41.042 21.142 43.442 48.142
32 WODAEMGNOL 51.042 50.142 98.342 47.142
42 MAHGNIH 21.142 56.042 52.342 07.142
52 GNIDAERHTRON 97.142 93.042 62.242 25.142
62 ENILKOORB 44.142 08.042 41.242 74.142
72 LLEWRON 82.142 96.832 83.442 44.142
82 MAHNEWNOTLIMAH 29.042 62.142 89.142 73.142
92 YRUBSWERHS 84.042 96.932 12.342 81.142
03 YRUBXUD 13.042 98.042 97.142 99.042
13 GERTTESUHCAW 39.932 91.142 27.142 59.042
23 GNIDAER 10.142 94.932 29.142 28.042
33 ELBATSNUDNOTORG 20.142 22.042 25.042 85.042
43 TEMONOCSAM 16.932 48.042 48.042 54.042
63 RETSEHCNAM 50.832 77.042 73.142 50.042
63 YAWDEM 79.932 79.832 71.142 50.042
73 HCIWDNAS 47.932 89.932 33.042 20.042
83 NOTNIKPOH 45.932 21.732 15.242 28.932
93 XONEL 44.932 79.932 98.932 87.932
04 ABOHSAN 55.932 85.832 89.042 86.932
14 NOTSLYOBNILREB 85.832 39.832 39.042 15.932
24 DLEIFNNYL 51.932 99.632 74.242 84.932
34 NOTELTTIL 44.832 95.832 69.042 13.932
44 LANOIGERTEKCUTNEP 72.832 25.932 37.932 02.932
54 NOTGNILRA 95.832 84.932 72.932 21.932
64 REVONAH 17.832 70.832 85.042 90.932
74 NILKNARF 54.732 37.832 87.042 40.932
94 DAEHELBRAM 57.832 16.732 46.042 89.832
94 ETAUTICS 82.932 31.732 14.042 89.832
Appendix 1
MCAS Grand Averages for 1998, 1999, 2000 and Three Year
Consolidated Grand Average By District
(Ranked by Three Year Average Performance)
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94 ETAUTICS 82.932 31.732 14.042 89.832
05 TESUAN 58.732 03.732 09.142 79.832
15 TTOCSPMAWS 41.632 46.042 05.932 37.832
25 NOTSLYOBTSEW 61.832 84.632 35.042 44.832
45 DROFSMLEHC 98.732 55.632 44.042 92.832
45 YELDAH 53.832 08.732 97.832 92.832
55 NOTNAC 55.632 45.732 43.042 31.832
65 REITNORF 08.632 90.632 12.142 80.832
75 KCITAN 25.832 23.632 54.932 70.832
85 NRUBOW 60.832 83.632 64.932 89.732
95 REVODNAHTRON 71.732 37.732 20.932 79.732
06 NOTSILLOH 57.632 55.832 62.832 88.732
16 EERTNIARB 06.532 58.632 69.042 87.732
26 DOOWRON 81.732 04.732 11.832 75.732
36 HCIWSPI 90.732 48.532 58.932 65.732
46 MAHENOTS 04.732 28.632 14.832 35.732
56 MAHLEPTSREHMA 68.732 37.832 94.532 53.732
66 NOTLIM 28.632 85.532 73.932 43.732
76 ELOPLAW 32.732 08.632 39.732 23.732
86 NWOTEGROEG 39.632 58.432 33.042 42.732
96 NOTSAE 10.632 95.632 41.932 22.732
07 TROPYRUBWEN 78.632 42.732 14.732 71.732
27 WODAEMGNOLTSAE 07.632 02.632 65.832 41.732
27 MAHARBLIWNEDPMAH 37.632 66.632 30.832 41.732
37 HGUOROBSGNYT 26.532 07.532 27.932 11.732
47 TROPKCOR 69.632 17.432 29.932 60.732
57 PILIHPGNIK 90.632 15.732 43.732 00.732
67 DLEIFTAH 32.632 07.832 42.632 69.632
77 NOTFARG 30.732 17.432 20.932 09.632
87 DLEIFSNAM 81.532 57.532 81.932 57.632
97 NOTPUNODNEM 54.732 93.532 46.632 15.632
08 HGUOROBXOF 05.432 07.532 18.832 83.632
18 DLEIFHSRAM 95.532 19.532 50.732 81.632
28 NOTGNILRUB 42.532 96.432 01.832 50.632
38 DRAYENIVSAHTRAM 46.532 49.432 94.732 40.632
48 NRUBUA 25.632 49.532 35.532 00.632
58 MAHTAHC 22.532 29.432 85.732 48.532
68 XESELDDIMHTRON 68.532 80.532 92.632 47.532
78 DNALHSA 56.532 72.532 71.632 07.532
88 DLEIFEKAW 40.532 82.532 67.632 86.532
98 EKALREVLIS 02.532 25.432 39.632 75.532
19 NOTRON 52.532 00.432 51.732 35.532
19 RETAWEGDIRBTSEW 83.532 41.432 62.732 35.532
29 YLREVEB 53.532 06.332 95.732 15.532
39 ELADEPOH 31.432 27.432 38.732 54.532
49 HTOBOHERNOTHGID 78.432 26.432 45.632 73.532
69 SREVNAD 19.432 41.332 72.732 31.532
69 NOTTUS 66.232 43.532 21.732 31.532
79 HGUOROBELTTAHTRON 33.432 87.432 97.532 99.432
89 SILLIM 27.432 81.332 21.732 98.432
99 RETSEHCORDLO 04.432 75.332 94.632 78.432
001 ERIHSPMAH 15.332 47.332 12.632 47.432
101 NIBBAUQ 41.432 28.432 30.532 76.432
201 NOTGNIMLIW 82.432 60.432 04.532 95.432
301 NWOTREHCLEB 28.332 97.332 11.632 85.432
501 MAHDED 53.332 77.232 15.732 35.432
501 TEKCUTNAN 34.432 15.132 68.732 35.432
601 KCOLYERGTNUOM 07.532 39.232 60.532 05.432
 Rank S HOOL                              1 98          1999          2 00          9 -00
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701 YRUBLLIM 37.332 65.332 80.632 44.432
801 ESORLEM 01.332 32.432 49.532 04.432
901 RETSNIMTSEWMAHNRUBHSA 67.332 72.432 70.532 93.432
011 YRUBSKWET 46.332 16.232 72.632 42.432
111 NOTPMAHTRON 41.432 43.332 23.532 32.432
311 HCIWRAH 75.532 62.332 18.332 81.432
311 HTUOMYLP 27.332 88.332 59.432 81.432
411 ACIRELLIB 93.432 65.232 05.532 71.432
511 GRUBNENUL 26.432 06.232 52.532 51.432
611 EGDIRBXU 91.232 66.332 54.632 41.432
711 YBNARG 20.332 95.232 34.632 31.432
911 MAHNYARRETAWEGDIRB 94.432 67.332 20.432 90.432
911 ERIHSKREBLARTNEC 79.532 28.232 24.332 90.432
121 NOSNOM 11.232 46.432 03.532 00.432
121 NWOTECNIVORP 77.032 80.732 10.432 00.432
221 NOSDUH 32.332 89.232 85.532 49.332
321 NOTIRT 05.232 36.432 53.432 38.332
421 NOTLRAHCYELDUD
LANOIGER
94.332 63.232 02.532 67.332
521 NOTHGUOTS 65.232 75.332 09.432 86.332
621 RETSECIEL 00.232 73.332 15.532 76.332
721 MAHGNIMARF 29.232 33.332 16.432 16.332
821 AUQSATNAT 19.132 88.232 22.532 74.332
921 ELLIVLLIMENOTSKCALB 08.132 64.332 00.532 64.332
031 NOTGNIBA 63.132 50.332 26.532 04.332
131 NOSNAHNAMTIHW 91.332 70.332 86.332 13.332
231 DROFLIM 34.232 69.132 64.532 03.332
331 HTUOMLAF 31.232 50.332 55.432 42.332
431 ELBATSNRAB 36.232 76.232 93.432 22.332
531 YRUBSEMA 67.232 67.032 93.532 50.332
631 NOTNILC 02.232 17.232 40.432 69.232
731 NWOTRETAW 89.032 29.232 07.432 88.232
831 REYA 89.132 22.232 82.432 68.232
931 REVRAC 59.922 03.332 01.532 87.232
141 SALGUOD 28.132 36.032 76.532 27.232
141 HTUOMRAYSINNED 19.232 83.132 69.332 27.232
241 MAWAGA 14.232 58.132 48.332 17.232
341 MAHGNILLEB 94.132 25.332 36.232 45.232
441 TUCARD 97.132 93.232 13.332 94.232
541 KNOKEES 94.132 48.132 40.432 64.232
641 EEL 54.332 06.132 13.232 34.232
741 HTUOMTRAD 90.232 92.232 57.232 83.232
841 DLEIFKOORBTSAERECNEPS 89.232 28.032 43.332 73.232
941 RETAWEGDIRBTSAE 59.132 10.032 19.432 53.232
051 LIARTKWAHOM 46.132 63.132 18.332 22.232
151 AESNAWS 05.232 89.922 39.332 80.232
351 ENRUOB 69.032 23.032 99.432 30.232
351 YDOBAEP 04.132 19.132 67.232 30.232
451 DNALLOTKCIWHTUOS 15.032 93.032 53.532 10.232
551 TESREMOS 87.922 57.032 99.432 18.132
651 DRANYAM 74.232 78.132 20.132 77.132
751 DNALKCOR 57.032 96.032 06.332 47.132
851 YCNIUQ 09.032 12.132 95.232 65.132
951 SUGUAS 44.132 69.032 03.232 55.132
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061 PORHTNIW 01.032 16.132 59.232 15.132
161 EGDIRBHTRON 64.032 35.032 14.332 84.132
261 HGUOROBLRAM 86.032 93.132 02.232 44.132
361 ELLIVEKALNWOTEERF 08.032 32.032 90.332 63.132
461 HTUOMYEW 09.032 67.032 80.232 62.132
561 YELDAHHTUOS 72.132 30.032 50.232 31.132
661 DLEIFKOORBHTRON 13.132 27.032 80.132 30.132
761 LANOIGERGAOBAUQ 73.132 56.922 38.132 59.032
861 .GERYELLAVREENOIP 58.032 65.922 43.232 39.032
961 LLUH 16.032 60.922 90.332 98.032
071 NEUHTEM 31.032 52.032 99.132 18.032
171 RETSECUOLG 87.032 68.822 18.232 87.032
271 RAHAMHPLAR 10.032 97.032 60.132 46.032
471 KOORBLOH 26.722 94.032 22.332 45.032
471 HGUOROBELDDIM 67.032 84.822 93.232 45.032
571 EEPHSAM 25.922 23.822 53.332 84.032
671 YAWETAG 26.922 28.032 76.032 93.032
771 SLLIHERIHSKREB 64.132 98.232 05.622 23.032
871 WOLDUL 45.032 40.032 23.032 03.032
971 ERIHSEHCSMADA 19.032 46.822 13.132 82.032
081 RETSNIMOEL 71.922 87.922 63.132 11.032
181 NEVAHRIAF 37.922 07.922 12.132 90.032
281 DROFXO 60.032 36.922 21.032 29.922
381 EUGATNOMLLIG 24.922 00.922 81.132 08.922
481 MAHTLAW 11.922 45.822 79.032 15.922
681 OROBELTTA 51.922 16.822 84.032 34.922
681 RENDRAG 49.722 63.922 70.132 34.922
781 YTINUMMOCTROPTSEW 91.922 62.922 20.922 61.922
881 TTEREVE 99.822 07.822 71.922 59.822
981 DLEIFGNIRPSTSEW 59.722 28.822 41.922 36.822
091 DROFDEM 28.722 03.722 77.032 06.822
191 DLEIFNEERG 24.822 53.722 61.032 95.822
291 HPLODNAR 97.722 02.622 40.232 75.822
391 NOTPMAHTSAE 81.722 08.822 55.922 15.822
491 REMLAP 85.822 02.722 46.922 05.822
591 MAHERAW 53.722 27.722 13.032 84.822
691 DLEIFSTTIP 32.922 98.722 60.822 93.822
791 ERIHSKREBNREHTUOS 20.822 26.622 93.032 43.822
891 DLEIFTSEW 29.722 10.822 70.922 33.822
991 RETSBEW 38.822 05.722 48.722 70.822
002 SMADAHTRON 92.822 04.622 57.922 50.822
102 TTESNAGARRAN 29.622 38.722 68.822 78.722
202 NOVA 53.822 98.522 52.922 97.722
302 EGDIRBHTUOS 23.622 18.622 98.922 66.722
402 ERAW 13.622 67.622 47.922 36.722
502 NEDLAM 76.722 62.722 58.722 95.722
602 NOTSLAYORLOHTA 04.722 40.722 52.822 75.722
702 MELAS 65.622 35.622 56.922 25.722
802 NODNEHCNIW 42.722 50.822 21.722 64.722
902 LLIHREVAH 68.622 50.622 28.722 29.622
012 EREVER 09.522 15.522 55.822 16.622
112 ELLIVREMOS 15.522 53.622 44.622 01.622
212 EGDIRBMAC 06.822 03.722 33.222 70.622
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381 EUGATNOMLLIG 24.922 00.922 81.132 08.922
481 MAHTLAW 11.922 45.822 79.032 15.922
681 OROBELTTA 51.922 16.822 84.032 34.922
681 RENDRAG 49.722 63.922 70.132 34.922
781 YTINUMMOCTROPTSEW 91.922 62.922 20.922 61.922
881 TTEREVE 99.822 07.822 71.922 59.822
981 DLEIFGNIRPSTSEW 59.722 28.822 41.922 36.822
091 DROFDEM 28.722 03.722 77.032 06.822
191 DLEIFNEERG 24.822 53.722 61.032 95.822
291 HPLODNAR 97.722 02.622 40.232 75.822
391 NOTPMAHTSAE 81.722 08.822 55.922 15.822
491 REMLAP 85.822 02.722 46.922 05.822
591 MAHERAW 53.722 27.722 13.032 84.822
691 DLEIFSTTIP 32.922 98.722 60.822 93.822
791 ERIHSKREBNREHTUOS 20.822 26.622 93.032 43.822
891 DLEIFTSEW 29.722 10.822 70.922 33.822
991 RETSBEW 38.822 05.722 48.722 70.822
002 SMADAHTRON 92.822 04.622 57.922 50.822
102 TTESNAGARRAN 29.622 38.722 68.822 78.722
202 NOVA 53.822 98.522 52.922 97.722
302 EGDIRBHTUOS 23.622 18.622 98.922 66.722
402 ERAW 13.622 67.622 47.922 36.722
502 NEDLAM 76.722 62.722 58.722 95.722
602 NOTSLAYORLOHTA 04.722 40.722 52.822 75.722
702 MELAS 65.622 35.622 56.922 25.722
802 NODNEHCNIW 42.722 50.822 21.722 64.722
902 LLIHREVAH 68.622 50.622 28.722 29.622
012 EREVER 09.522 15.522 55.822 16.622
112 ELLIVREMOS 15.522 53.622 44.622 01.622
212 EGDIRBMAC 06.822 03.722 33.222 70.622
312 NOTNUAT 73.422 55.522 82.822 40.622
412 RETSECROW 99.522 40.522 68.522 26.522
512 GRUBHCTIF 93.422 06.422 06.522 78.422
612 EEPOCIHC 30.422 08.322 89.422 62.422
712 NOTKCORB 15.222 71.222 52.422 89.222
812 AESLEHC 90.122 08.522 24.122 57.222
912 REVIRLLAF 98.122 36.222 03.322 95.222
022 NNYL 86.122 10.122 47.422 05.222
122 DROFDEBWEN 98.122 14.122 77.322 93.222
222 LLEWOL 53.122 46.122 61.322 50.222
322 NOTSOB 91.912 70.022 14.122 32.022
422 DLEIFGNIRPS 29.812 66.812 40.022 91.912
522 ECNERWAL 18.712 61.712 35.712 05.712
622 EKOYLOH 94.712 89.612 23.712 72.712


























Without and With History Test Scores
42 DLEIFNNYL 31.742 74.542
52 REVODNA 78.642 34.542
62 GNIDAER 57.642 40.542
72 MAHNEW-NOTLIMAH 56.642 11.542
82 ENILKOORB 15.642 36.442
92 OROBHTUOS-OROBHTRON 44.642 46.442
03 YRUBSWERHS 03.642 23.442
13 REVONAH 42.642 96.442
23 YRUBXUD 87.542 94.342
33 LANOIGERXESSERETSEHCNAM 37.542 04.442
43 LLEWRON 27.542 35.442
63 TTESUHCAW 66.542 38.342
63 DAEHELBRAM 93.542 09.342
73 TESUAN 23.542 82.342
83 TEMONOCSAM 52.542 72.342
93 GNIDAERHTRON 81.542 40.442
04 NOTNIKPOH 51.542 24.342
14 ETAUTICS 31.542 03.342
24 ABOHSAN 79.442 66.242
34 YAWDEM 37.442 25.342
44 NILKNARF 76.442 86.242
54 NOTGNILRA 26.442 77.242
64 EERTNIARB 85.442 95.242
Rank School                                 W/O HIST     WITH HISTknaR loohcS TSIHO/W TSIHHTIW
1 YELSELLEW 21.252 80.052
2 NOTGNIXEL 91.152 92.942
3 ELSILRAC-DROCNOC 31.152 00.942
4 HGUOROBXOB-NOTCA 85.052 09.742
5 DNALYAW 54.052 34.842
6 RETSEHCNIW 03.052 98.742
7 NOTWEN 01.052 61.842
8 NOTSEW 16.942 02.842
9 DOOWTSEW 83.942 12.742
01 NROBREHS-REVOD 52.942 43.742
11 TESSAHOC 99.842 77.642
21 NORAHS 47.842 04.642
31 DRAVRAH 17.842 85.642
41 YRUBDUS-NLOCNIL 56.842 68.642
51 MAHDEEN 95.842 58.642
61 DROFTSEW 54.842 86.642
71 TNOMLEB 42.842 62.642
91 HGUOROBTSEW 68.742 84.642
91 DLEIFDEM 18.742 21.642
02 MAHGNIH 86.742 69.542
12 WODAEMGNOL 65.742 80.642
22 DROFDEB 92.742 15.542
32 ELBATSNUD-NOTORG 62.742 25.542
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Appendix 3
Tests for Spatial Autocorrelation in the MCAS Data
Previous studies of MCAS have not raised any questions about the presence of
spatial autocorrelation in the data. But this question is important, since if the data
are spatially autocorrelated, the most common statistical technique for analyzing the
data — ordinary least squares regression — is likely to yield misleading results.
There are essentially two ways of investigating this possibility. The first and most
direct is to run a specific test for this possibility. A variety of such tests exist; the
most common is probably the so-called “Moran” test. (For a general survey see Luc
Anselin and Rosina Moreao, “Properties of Tests for Spatial Error Components,”
2000.) In our case, one would test for spatial autocorrelation on the dependent vari-
able — the three year grand average of MCAS district scores. The second is to esti-
mate our main cross-sectional equation via ordinary least squares and then show that
its residuals are spatially autocorrelated.
Both procedures indicate that spatial autocorrelation is present in the MCAS data.
Formally, in the former case, where Y
i 
, i = 1,2 … 226  is the grand average of
MCAS scores for years 1998, 1999, and 2000 for district i , a Moran test shows that
the estimated spatial autocorrelation is .3467 with a test statistic of 8.613 and p-
value = 0. We report results for the other test, on the residuals of ordinary least
squares versions of our cross-sectional model, in Appendices 4 and 5. These indicate
that purely linear models of MCAS suffer from the presence of spatial
autocorrelation.  By contrast, Moran tests and plots of the residuals of all of our
spatial models (omitted from this paper for reasons of space) indicate that they are
not autocorrelated.
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Appendix 4
Cross-Sectional Spatial Regression Equation for
Predicting School District MCAS Performance
Appendix 3 showed that the our dependent variable, the three year grand average
of school district MCAS scores, is marked by appreciable spatial autocorrelation.
An analysis of an ordinary least squares version of our cross-sectional equation rein-
forces this conclusion. Formally, let Y
i
be the three year grand average of MCAS
scores of the ith  district i = 1,2,...,226, and let X
ij
,j = 1,2,...12 be the independent
variables listed below in Table A4.2 of this Appendix.
We test for spatial autocorrelation for the residuals of the ordinary least squares
(OLS) version of our cross-sectional model using an S-PLUS function
moranForLM.q developed by Kaluzny, based on a formula of Cliff and Ord.86   For-














The small P-value of the test results indicates that the residuals are indeed spa-
tially autocorrelated. Table A4.1 lists the estimated spatial autocorrelations of the
residuals of the OLS model and the associated test statistic.
Table A4.1
Morans autocorrelation test for the residuals from
 an ordinary least squares linear regression model. Equation (A4.1):
Moran Autocorrelation Z statistic P-value
0.2077 5.5801 0.0000
We now consider a spatial regression model. Once again, let Y
i
 b  the response
variable of the three year grand average of MCAS scores for the ith  district, i = 1,2,
... ,226.  Following Cressie, we now employ a Simultaneous Spatial Autoregression















where the error term g
i



















,j=1,2,...12  are the covariate variables listed in Table A4.2 below; while W is
the neighborhood matrix defined as:
(A4.3)




 = { 1 if i is connected to j0 if i = j or if i is not connected to j (A4.4)
In matrix notation, Equation (A4.2) can be written as:
Y = X$ + DW(Y - X$) + ,
or
(I - DW)(Y - X$) = ,
provided the covariance matrix of Y, [(I - DW)’( I - DW)F2
0
]-1 is symmetric and
positively-defined. Both D and F2
0
 are unknown scale parameters that can be esti-
mated by minimizing the negative log likelihood of Equation (A4.6). If D is fixed,
the m.l. estimators of $ are
$ = (X’(I - DW)(I - DW)X)-1X(I - DW)’(I - DW)Y
 We estimate this using the SLM function of the program S-Plus, as discussed
earlier. Table A4.2 shows the estimated coefficients and associated p-values.  Figure
1 of this Appendix, below, plots the residuals of Equation (A4.2) as a histogram and
in the form of a Q-Q normal plot.  In sharp contrast to our results for (A4.1), these
indicate that the residuals from the spatial regression model approximate very well a
normal distribution. Not surprisingly, when the Moran test is run on this model, the
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Appendix 4, Figure 1
Histogram of residuals based on model A4.2 (Left)
Q-Q Normal Plot of residuals based on model A4.2 (Right)
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Appendix 5
School Districts Ranked By Value Added
Residuals For 4 Economic/Demographic Variables
(See Text  Details of  Economic/Demographic Equation Below)
KNAR LOOHCS 00-89 098SER SMAXELATOTRY3
1 MAHLEPTSREHMA 53.732 37.6 9078
2 XONEL 87.932 30.6 1071
3 DRAVRAH 06.542 75.5 1542
4 HGUOROBTSEW 67.242 10.5 1526
5 TNOMLEB 59.342 16.4 3807
6 TESUAN 79.832 64.4 7386
7 GNIDAERHTRON 25.142 24.4 8644
8 NOTPMAHTRON 32.432 02.4 1016
9 HGUOROBXOBNOTCA 23.542 02.4 70301
01 MAHNEWNOTLIMAH 73.142 98.3 6205
11 HCIWDNAS 20.042 97.3 6497
21 NOTGNILRA 21.932 54.3 3518
31 NOTWEN 06.342 43.3 00622
41 YELDAH 92.832 33.3 4721
51 DROFDEB 59.142 13.3 3114
61 DLEIFDEM 61.442 31.3 2835
71 NOTRON 35.532 69.2 1535
81 REITNORF 80.832 49.2 7723
91 YRUBSWERHS 81.142 29.2 9328
02 EERTNIARB 87.732 68.2 4979
12 DOOWRON 75.732 38.2 8486
22 NRUBOW 89.732 47.2 3119
32 YAWDEM 58.042 47.2 5874
42 GNIDAER 28.042 76.2 0038
52 YLREVEB 15.532 75.2 3969
62 NWOTREHCLEB 85.432 45.2 8164
72 LANOIGERTEKCUTNEP 02.932 35.2 1096
82 NOTSLYOBTSEW 44.832 25.2 4822
92 YRUBLLIM 44.432 15.2 2453
03 MAHDEEN 91.342 34.2 7978
13 DLEIFSNAM 57.632 34.2 1637
23 GERTTESUHCAW 59.042 73.2 56331
33 YELSELLEW 83.542 63.2 1796
43 TTOCSPMAWS 37.832 63.2 6355
53 ENILKOORB 74.142 33.2 19611
63 MAHENOTS 35.732 03.2 8755
73 AESLEHC 57.222 32.2 5719
83 NILKNARF 40.932 22.2 1239
93 HTUOMRAYSINNED 27.232 22.2 5698
04 REVONAH 90.932 12.2 2115
14 DOOWTSEW 35.242 81.2 9674
24 MAHGNIMARF 16.332 41.2 48541
34 DLEIFGNIRPS 91.912 90.2 21064
44 WODAEMGNOLTSAE 41.732 20.2 4835
54 NWOTECNIVORP 00.432 99.1 658
64 KCITAN 70.832 69.1 6197
74 EGDIRBHTUOS 66.722 39.1 2784
84 REVODNA 92.242 19.1 15811
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94 TROPYRUBWEN 71.732 67.1 4594
05 HTUOMYLP 81.432 57.1 31271
15 NOTHGUOTS 86.332 86.1 8428
25 SMADAHTRON 50.822 95.1 0615
35 DROFTSEW 03.242 95.1 7518
45 KCOLYERGTNUOM 05.432 85.1 8933
55 NOTGNIXEL 56.442 35.1 17711
65 NORAHS 54.242 35.1 6396
75 ELSILRACDROCNOC 45.542 05.1 3596
85 REYA 68.232 84.1 5153
95 ELBATSNRAB 22.332 44.1 07931
06 NOTNILC 69.232 24.1 9083
16 OROBHTUOSOROBHTRON 03.242 14.1 5008
26 TROPKCOR 60.732 73.1 3432
36 RETAWEGDIRBTSEW 35.532 53.1 7012
46 DRAYENIVSAHTRAM 40.632 53.1 2984
56 MAHTAHC 48.532 43.1 9731
66 MAWAGA 17.232 03.1 3468
76 ETAUTICS 89.832 03.1 7995
86 DROFLIM 03.332 92.1 3587
96 RAHAMHPLAR 46.032 32.1 6863
07 MAHGNIH 07.142 32.1 4396
17 NOTLIM 43.732 12.1 6277
27 AUQSATNAT 74.332 12.1 7976
37 HTUOMLAF 42.332 31.1 2479
RANK    SCHOOL  98-00              RES890   3 YR TOTAL EXAMS
47 HGUOROBSGNYT 11.732 21.1 9693
57 NOTELTTIL 13.932 90.1 4252
67 ABOHSAN 86.932 40.1 5085
77 HCIWSPI 65.732 10.1 3373
87 NWOTEGROEG 42.732 10.1 3252
97 NOTKCORB 89.222 69. 76692
08 LIARTKWAHOM 22.232 19. 4983
18 RENDRAG 34.922 78. 4906
28 NRUBUA 00.632 68. 9384
38 LLEWRON 44.142 77. 6793
48 HCIWRAH 81.432 47. 7803
58 ELBATSNUDNOTORG 85.042 07. 4764
68 YRUBSEMA 50.332 96. 6545
78 NOTSLYOBNILREB 15.932 86. 5302
88 DLEIFNEERG 95.822 66. 1084
98 DROFDEBWEN 93.222 66. 63482
09 NOTFARG 09.632 56. 4834
19 HTOBOHERNOTHGID 73.532 85. 3566
29 RETSECIEL 76.332 25. 1683
39 NIBBAUQ 76.432 64. 0516
49 DLEIFKOORBTSAERECNEPS 73.232 73. 6154
59 HGUOROBXOF 83.632 63. 6955
69 LANOIGERGAOBAUQ 59.032 43. 4403
79 EKALREVLIS 75.532 33. 76531
89 DROFSMLEHC 92.832 33. 79211
99 DLEIFTAH 69.632 23. 968
001 PILIHPGNIK 00.732 92. 1309
101 NNYL 05.222 82. 79362
201 NOSNOM 00.432 72. 3672
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301 TTEREVE 59.822 32. 9059
401 ENRUOB 30.232 32. 2194
501 MAHNYARRETAWEGDIRB 90.432 22. 92411
601 NEVAHRIAF 90.032 51. 9426
701 EGDIRBHTRON 84.132 41. 5644
801 ELADEPOH 54.532 31. 7402
901 YRUBXUD 99.042 11. 3116
011 YCNIUQ 65.132 70. 54761
111 KOORBLOH 45.032 10. 9772
211 DLEIFEKAW 86.532 10. 3296
311 HGUOROBELDDIM 45.032 00. 1337
411 RETSECROW 26.522 10.- 48324
511 RETSEHCNIW 00.442 20.- 7946
611 NOTNAC 31.832 50.- 2585
711 NEUHTEM 18.032 50.- 17031
811 NOTSOB 32.022 60.- 237011
911 DNALKCOR 47.132 60.- 3535
021 ERIHSEHCSMADA 82.032 70.- 0714
121 NOTSAE 22.732 01.- 1517
221 MAHARBLIWNEDPMAH 41.732 11.- 3677
321 MAHERAW 84.822 71.- 9137
421 NOTNIKPOH 28.932 12.- 5974
521 NOTSILLOH 88.732 43.- 5295
621 EREVER 16.622 83.- 56701
721 REVODNAHTRON 79.732 83.- 7738
821 EGDIRBXU 41.432 93.- 2014
921 ELOPLAW 23.732 93.- 9427
031 EEPHSAM 84.032 93.- 3604
131 REVIRLLAF 95.222 04.- 27232
231 HPLODNAR 75.822 04.- 4518




531 ERIHSKREBLARTNEC 90.432 75.- 4515
631 SREVNAD 31.532 27.- 7967
731 XESELDDIMHTRON 47.532 37.- 0549
831 GRUBHCTIF 78.422 57.- 33701
931 HTUOMTRAD 83.232 38.- 0758
041 RETSEHCORDLO 78.432 48.- 6265
141 HGUOROBELTTAHTRON 99.432 68.- 8398
241 ERIHSPMAH 47.432 19.- 3964
341 EEL 34.232 69.- 2681
441 DLEIFNNYL 84.932 99.- 0493
541 DNALYAW 69.342 99.- 1355
641 TEMONOCSAM 54.042 00.1- 7108
741 REVRAC 87.232 40.1- 2334
841 NEDLAM 95.722 50.1- 01101
941 WODAEMGNOL 47.142 60.1- 4446
051 ACIRELLIB 71.432 70.1- 36121
151 TESSAHOC 48.142 90.1- 9162
251 NOSNAHNAMTIHW 13.332 01.1- 4398




RANK    SCHOOL    98-00             RES890    3 YR TOTAL EXAMS
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551 YAWETAG 93.032 31.1- 1113
651 ELLIVLLIMENOTSKCALB 64.332 41.1- 0754
751 DLEIFHSRAM 81.632 51.1- 2398
851 RETSECUOLG 87.032 61.1- 5748
951 LLUH 98.032 61.1- 6882
061 YBNARG 31.432 91.1- 9812
161 TEKCUTNAN 35.432 02.1- 8642
261 ESORLEM 04.432 32.1- 3496
361 NOTGNIBA 04.332 32.1- 3254
461 EKOYLOH 72.712 32.1- 96731
561 EUGATNOMLLIG 08.922 92.1- 3163
661 NOTTUS 31.532 13.1- 6692
761 RETSNIMOEL 11.032 33.1- 52021
861 NOTGNILRUB 50.632 53.1- 9007
961 SALGUOD 27.232 53.1- 6242
071 NOTPUNODNEM 15.632 53.1- 9073
171 YRUBSKWET 42.432 34.1- 1628
271 NOSDUH 49.332 44.1- 5994
371 MAHDED 35.432 84.1- 5295
471 DROFXO 29.922 15.1- 5724
571 ELLIVREMOS 01.622 65.1- 56301
671 DNALLOTKCIWHTUOS 10.232 85.1- 3744
771 HTUOMYEW 62.132 16.1- 08531
871 DLEIFGNIRPSTSEW 36.822 26.1- 8497
971 NOTSLAYORLOHTA 75.722 46.1- 4164
081 DNALHSA 07.532 17.1- 9434
181 AESNAWS 80.232 18.1- 9174
281 SLLIHERIHSKREB 23.032 48.1- 3083
381 DLEIFTSEW 33.822 59.1- 42431
481 DROFDEM 06.822 79.1- 4039
581 TUCARD 94.232 00.2- 6497
681 NWOTRETAW 88.232 30.2- 1415
781 PORHTNIW 15.132 31.2- 2934
881 RETSBEW 70.822 41.2- 9493
981 DLEIFSTTIP 93.822 71.2- 06731
091 NOTIRT 38.332 12.2- 2186
191 OROBELTTA 34.922 22.2- 05531
291 YDOBAEP 30.232 32.2- 76621
391 RETSEHCNAM 50.042 32.2- 7502
491 REMLAP 05.822 42.2- 5444
591 EEPOCIHC 62.422 03.2- 42441
691 RETAWEGDIRBTSAE 53.232 33.2- 7115
791 YRUBDUSNLOCNIL 46.242 33.2- 98001
891 .GERYELLAVREENOIP 39.032 73.2- 9832
991 MELAS 25.722 84.2- 4729
002 NOTGNIMLIW 95.432 05.2- 4086
102 MAHTLAW 15.922 35.2- 61101
202 ERAW 36.722 35.2- 2272
302 SILLIM 98.432 65.2- 8822
402 GRUBNENUL 51.432 86.2- 1883
502 KNOKEES 64.232 18.2- 6474
602 WOLDUL 03.032 38.2- 8026
702 ELLIVEKALNWOTEERF 63.132 19.2- 2716
RANK    SCHOOL   98-00             RES890     3 YR TOTAL EXAMS
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802 DAEHELBRAM 89.832 49.2- 2165
902 MAHGNILLEB 45.232 00.3- 9535
012 YELDAHHTUOS 31.132 10.3- 7974
112 SUGUAS 55.132 40.3- 8366
212 NODNEHCNIW 64.722 90.3- 5993
312 NOTNUAT 40.622 33.3- 85651
412 NOTPMAHTSAE 15.822 94.3- 1373
512 HGUOROBLRAM 44.132 55.3- 8208
612 EGDIRBMAC 70.622 76.3- 88731
712 ECNERWAL 05.712 86.3- 47612
812 LLIHREVAH 29.622 42.4- 21761
912 DRANYAM 77.132 54.4- 6562
022 NOVA 97.722 54.4- 0661
122 LLEWOL 50.222 06.4- 45892
222 YTINUMMOCTROPTSEW 61.922 20.5- 1783
322 TTESNAGARRAN 78.722 71.5- 1492
422 ERIHSKREBNREHTUOS 43.822 80.6- 7512
522 NROBREHSREVOD 21.442 11.6- 0673
622 NOTSEW 51.542 04.6- 7804
Details of the Value Added Model
As explained in the text, this model attempts to estimate the three year grand aver-
age score that would be predicted for each district purely on the basis of its econom-
ics and demographics. A comparison of that predicted score with the district’s actual
grand average shows whether the district over- or under- performed its demograph-
ics and economics. The residual — the difference between the two scores — quanti-
fies the degree of that over or under-performance.
Formally, the value added model is equivalent to our full model presented in
Appendix 4, save that the only covariates this model employs are those for economic















,i = 1,2,...226 is the grand average of MCAS scores for years 1998, 1999,
and 2000 for district i, and X
ij
, j = 1,2,3,4 are the covariates of economic and demo-
graphic factors. They are AFRICAN-AMERICAN, PERCAP, TWOPHLD, and
TAFDCPER. (LIM.ENG, which might quite reasonably be deemed a non-school
related variable, is not used in this equation, since in combination with these vari-
ables alone it is not significant.)  Not surprisingly, however, a Moran test indicates
that the residuals of Equation (A5.1) are also spatially autocorrelated. The test re-
sults are summarized in Table A5.1.
Table A5.1
Morans autocorrelation test for the residuals
from an ordinary linear regression model A5.1.
          Moran Autocorrelation Z statistic P-value
           0.2018 5.2931 0.0000
4
j=1
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Once again, accordingly, we turn to a Simultaneous Spatial Autoregression (SAR)
model equation based on the S PLUS function SLM of Kaluzny and the earlier




























The estimated coefficients and p-values are listed in Table A5.2.
Table A5.2
Estimated Coefficients and P-values of Value Added Model
  S-PLUS
                   Estimated Coefficients
INTERCEPT         221.54(.00)
AFRICAN           -0.16(.00)
PERCAP            0.59(.00)
TWOPHLD            0.12(.00)
TAFDCPER           -2.12(.00)
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Appendix 6
Improvements in School District Scores 19982000
Most to Least
(Average Annual Change  See Text)
KOORBLOH 45.032 9772 08.2
EERTNIARB 87.732 4979 86.2
TESREMOS 18.132 7157 06.2
REVRAC 87.232 2334 75.2
DNALLOTKCIWHTUOS 10.232 3744 24.2
NOTTUS 01.532 6692 32.2
REITNORF 80.832 7723 12.2
HGUOROBXOF 83.632 6955 51.2
NOTGNIBA 04.332 3254 31.2
EGDIRBXU 41.432 2014 31.2
HPLODNAR 75.822 4518 31.2
DROFTSEW 03.242 7518 21.2
TESSAHOC 48.142 9162 01.2
MAHDED 35.432 5295 80.2
HGUOROBSGNYT 11.732 9693 50.2
TESUAN 79.832 7386 30.2
ENRUOB 30.232 2194 20.2
DLEIFSNAM 57.632 1637 00.2
NOTNUAT 40.622 85651 59.1
SALGUOD 27.232 6242 29.1
EEPHSAM 84.032 3604 19.1
NOTNAC 31.832 2585 09.1
WODAEMGNOL 47.142 4446 78.1
NWOTRETAW 88.232 1415 68.1
ELADEPOH 54.532 7402 58.1
DROFDEB 59.142 3114 48.1
EGDIRBHTUOS 66.722 2784 97.1
RETSECIEL 76.332 1683 67.1
TEKCUTNAN 35.432 8642 27.1
ERAW 36.722 2272 27.1
YBNARG 31.432 9812 17.1
NWOTEGROEG 42.732 3252 07.1
TTOCSPMAWS 37.832 6355 86.1
NILKNARF 40.932 1239 76.1
DLEIFNNYL 84.932 0493 66.1
RETSEHCNAM 50.042 7502 66.1
AUQSATNAT 74.332 7976 56.1
NWOTECNIVORP 00.432 658 26.1
ELLIVLLIMENOTSKCALB 64.332 0754 06.1
NOSNOM 00.432 3672 06.1
NOTSAE 22.732 1517 75.1
RENDRAG 34.922 4906 75.1
LLEWRON 44.142 6793 55.1
         TOTAL     AV. ANNUAL
SCHOOL 98-00                        EXAMS       CHANGE
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MELAS 25.722 4729 45.1
NNYL 05.222 79362 35.1
DROFLIM 03.332 3587 25.1
NOTNIKPOH 28.932 5974 84.1
RETAWEGDIRBTSAE 53.232 7115 84.1
MAHERAW 84.822 9137 84.1
TROPKCOR 60.732 3432 84.1
DROFDEM 06.822 4039 84.1
EGDIRBHTRON 84.132 5644 74.1
HGUOROBTSEW 67.242 1526 74.1
MAHDEEN 91.342 7978 54.1
DNALYAW 69.342 1355 44.1
NOTGNILRUB 50.632 9007 34.1
DNALKCOR 47.132 3535 34.1
PORHTNIW 15.132 2934 24.1
ESORLEM 04.432 3496 24.1
HCIWSPI 65.732 3373 83.1
ELSILRACDROCNOC 45.542 3596 83.1
YRUBSWERHS 81.142 9328 73.1
ERIHSPMAH 47.432 3964 53.1
EREVER 16.622 56701 23.1
YRUBSKWET 42.432 1628 23.1
YRUBSEMA 50.332 6545 13.1
NOTLIM 43.732 6277 82.1
DROFSMLEHC 92.832 79211 82.1
KNOKEES 64.232 6474 72.1
NOTELTTIL 13.932 4252 62.1
LLUH 98.032 6882 42.1
HTUOMLAF 42.332 2479 12.1
SILLIM 98.432 8822 02.1
NOTPMAHTSAE 15.822 1373 91.1
NOTSLYOBTSEW 44.832 4822 91.1
ERIHSKREBNREHTUOS 43.822 7512 81.1
SREVNAD 31.532 7967 81.1
MAHTAHC 48.532 9731 81.1
NOSDUH 49.332 5994 81.1
YRUBLLIM 44.432 2453 81.1
NOTSLYOBNILREB 15.932 5302 71.1
NOTHGUOTS 86.332 8428 71.1
REYA 68.232 5153 51.1
ELLIVEKALNWOTEERF 63.132 2716 41.1
NWOTREHCLEB 85.432 8164 41.1
YLREVEB 15.532 3969 21.1
NOTSOB 32.022 237011 11.1
RETSNIMOEL 11.032 52021 01.1
LIARTKWAHOM 22.232 4983 90.1
REVODNA 92.242 15811 80.1
MAHGNIH 07.142 4396 70.1
TNOMLEB 59.342 3807 60.1
         TOTAL     AV. ANNUAL
SCHOOL 98-00                        EXAMS       CHANGE
New England Journal of Public Policy
140
RETSEHCORDLO 78.432 6265 40.1
RETSECUOLG 87.032 5748 10.1
NOTFARG 09.632 4834 00.1
TTESNAGARRAN 78.722 1492 79.0
NOTRON 35.532 1535 59.0
DAEHELBRAM 89.832 2165 49.0
DROFDEBWEN 93.222 63482 49.0
RETAWEGDIRBTSEW 35.532 7012 49.0
REVONAH 90.932 2115 49.0
MAHTLAW 15.922 61101 39.0
WODAEMGNOLTSAE 41.732 4835 39.0
NEUHTEM 18.032 17031 39.0
DRAYENIVSAHTRAM 40.632 2984 39.0
REVODNAHTRON 79.732 7738 39.0
NOTIRT 38.332 2186 29.0
NOTNILC 69.232 9083 29.0
LLEWOL 50.222 45892 19.0
GERTTESUHCAW 59.042 56331 98.0
EUGATNOMLLIG 08.922 3163 88.0
ELBATSNRAB 22.332 07931 88.0
DLEIFNEERG 95.822 1084 78.0
NOTKCORB 89.222 76692 78.0
EKALREVLIS 75.532 76531 68.0
DLEIFEKAW 86.532 3296 68.0
LANOIGERNOTLRAHCYELDUD 67.332 2577 68.0
MAHGNIMARF 16.332 48541 58.0
YCNIUQ 65.132 54761 48.0
HTOBOHERNOTHGID 73.532 3566 48.0
HGUOROBXOBNOTCA 23.542 70301 28.0
HGUOROBELDDIM 45.032 1337 18.0
HGUOROBLRAM 44.132 8208 67.0
TUCARD 94.232 6497 67.0
NOTSILLOH 88.732 5295 67.0
.GERYELLAVREENOIP 39.032 9832 57.0
NEVAHRIAF 90.032 9426 47.0
YRUBXUD 99.042 3116 47.0
DLEIFHSRAM 81.632 2398 37.0
SMADAHTRON 50.822 0615 37.0
LANOIGERTEKCUTNEP 02.932 1096 37.0
HGUOROBELTTAHTRON 99.432 8398 37.0
MAWAGA 17.232 3468 27.0
ABOHSAN 86.932 5085 27.0
AESNAWS 80.232 9174 17.0
REVIRLLAF 95.222 27232 17.0
NRUBOW 89.732 3119 07.0
OROBHTUOSOROBHTRON 03.242 5008 96.0
YDOBAEP 30.232 76621 86.0
OROBELTTA 34.922 05531 66.0
         TOTAL     AV. ANNUAL
SCHOOL 98-00                        EXAMS       CHANGE
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RETSNIMTSEWMAHNRUBHSA 93.432 5425 66.0
MAHARBLIWNEDPMAH 41.732 3677 56.0
RETSEHCNIW 00.442 7946 56.0
PILIHPGNIK 00.732 1309 36.0
HTUOMYLP 81.432 31271 26.0
TEMONOCSAM 54.042 7108 16.0
GRUBHCTIF 78.422 33701 06.0
YAWDEM 50.042 5874 06.0
DLEIFGNIRPSTSEW 36.822 8497 95.0
NOTPMAHTRON 32.432 1016 95.0
HTUOMYEW 62.132 08531 95.0
DLEIFTSEW 33.822 42431 75.0
MAHGNILLEB 45.232 9535 75.0
ETAUTICS 89.832 7995 75.0
DLEIFGNIRPS 91.912 21064 65.0
NOTGNIMLIW 95.432 4086 65.0
DOOWTSEW 35.242 9674 65.0
ACIRELLIB 71.432 36121 55.0
REMLAP 05.822 5444 35.0
MAHNEWNOTLIMAH 73.142 6205 35.0
RAHAMHPLAR 46.032 6863 35.0
HTUOMRAYSINNED 27.232 5698 25.0
YAWETAG 93.032 1113 25.0
MAHENOTS 35.732 8755 15.0
LLIHREVAH 29.622 21761 84.0
EEPOCIHC 62.422 42441 74.0
KCITAN 70.832 6197 74.0
ELLIVREMOS 01.622 56301 74.0
DOOWRON 75.732 8486 64.0
GNIDAER 28.042 0038 64.0
NOVA 97.722 0661 54.0
DRAVRAH 06.542 1542 54.0
NIBBAUQ 76.432 0516 44.0
SUGUAS 55.132 8366 34.0
NOTSLAYORLOHTA 75.722 4164 24.0
NOTGNIXEL 56.442 17711 04.0
YELDAHHTUOS 31.132 7974 93.0
ENILKOORB 74.142 19611 53.0
ELOPLAW 23.732 9427 53.0
NOTGNILRA 21.932 3518 43.0
HTUOMTRAD 83.232 0758 33.0
NROBREHSREVOD 21.442 0673 23.0
GRUBNENUL 51.432 1883 13.0
HCIWDNAS 20.042 6497 92.0
TROPYRUBWEN 71.732 4594 72.0
NOTWEN 06.342 00622 62.0
DNALHSA 07.532 9434 62.0
NOSNAHNAMTIHW 13.332 4398 42.0
         TOTAL     AV. ANNUAL
SCHOOL 98-00                        EXAMS       CHANGE
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GNIDAERHTRON 25.142 8644 32.0
LANOIGERGAOBAUQ 59.032 4403 32.0
XONEL 87.932 1071 32.0
YELDAH 92.832 4721 22.0
XESELDDIMHTRON 47.532 0549 12.0
YRUBDUSNLOCNIL 46.242 98001 12.0
ERIHSEHCSMADA 82.032 0714 02.0
DLEIFKOORBTSAERECNEPS 73.232 6154 81.0
AESLEHC 57.222 5719 71.0
NOTSEW 51.542 7804 11.0
NEDLAM 95.722 01101 90.0
TTEREVE 59.822 9059 90.0
DROFXO 29.922 5724 30.0
YELSELLEW 83.542 1796 30.0
DLEIFTAH 69.632 968 10.0
DLEIFDEM 61.442 2835 60.0-
NODNEHCNIW 64.722 5993 60.0-
RETSECROW 26.522 48324 60.0-
EKOYLOH 72.712 96731 80.0-
YTINUMMOCTROPTSEW 61.922 1783 90.0-
WOLDUL 03.032 8026 11.0-
DLEIFKOORBHTRON 30.132 7361 11.0-
ECNERWAL 05.712 47612 41.0-
MAHNYARRETAWEGDIRB 90.432 92411 42.0-
ELBATSNUDNOTORG 85.042 4764 52.0-
KCOLYERGTNUOM 05.432 8933 23.0-
NOTPUNODNEM 15.632 9073 04.0-
NORAHS 54.242 6396 14.0-
NRUBUA 00.632 9384 05.0-
RETSBEW 70.822 9493 05.0-
EEL 34.232 2681 75.0-
DLEIFSTTIP 93.822 06731 95.0-
DRANYAM 77.132 6562 27.0-
HCIWRAH 81.432 7803 88.0-
MAHLEPTSREHMA 53.732 9078 91.1-
ERIHSKREBLARTNEC 90.432 4515 72.1-
SLLIHERIHSKREB 23.032 3083 84.2-
EGDIRBMAC 70.622 88731 41.3-
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Appendix 7
Analysis of Change in MCAS Scores, 1998 to 2000
Our main text has emphasized the special problems involving measurement and
random error that beset analyses of changes in test scores. Bearing in mind all the
necessary qualifications, let Y
ij
be the grand average of MCAS scores in the ith  dis-
trict, i = 1,2,...,226, and  jth year, and  T
ij
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Here the error term g
ij
 is assumed to be independent across each district  and
normally distributed.  $
0i
 is the random intercept that varies across districts while $
1i
is the average rate of change in MCAS scores in district i over the three year pe-
riod.88 Both the intercept and growth-rate are allowed to vary at level 2 as outcome



























































 are the district characteristic variables associated with the coefficients
listed in Table A7.1 and u
0i
 ~ N(0,J)  Substituting Equations (A7.2) and (A7.3) in

























































The estimated coefficients are listed in Table A7.1.
We estimated this model using both the HMLM component of the HLM program
and SAS PROC MIXED. In HLM, we estimated an unrestricted model, since com-
parisons with various alternatives indicated that it performed better. The deviance
statistics show clearly that a substantial amount of the improvement in our model
comes from the intercept, though the T statistics for the terms for both state aid and








with estimated coefficients and P-values.
Fixed Effect Definition    Coefficient   S.E.
      (P-value)
(00=INTERCEPT 212.14 (.00) 2.17
(01=TPERCAP Per Capita Income (Unit: $1,000)      .49 (.00)   .05
(02=TWOPHLD Percent of Households With 2 Parents      .06 (.02)   .03
(03=TAFDCPER Percentage of TAFDC    -1.82 (.00)   .29
(04=AFRICAN- Percentage of Students of    -0.22 (.00)   .03
      AMERICAN African-American Descent
(05=TSMX989 Teachers Maximum Salary 1998-99       .15 (.00)   .05
(Unit: $1,000)
(06=TSAL Superintendents Salary (Unit: $1000)      .04 (.00)   .01
(07=LIM.ENG Percentage of Students    -0.16 (.00)   .06
with Limited English
(10=time YEAR      .46 (.00)   .08
(11=GRC7TS40 Difference in Chap 70 Funds As Percent     1.86 (.01)   .69
of Actual Total Spending 1994 - 2000
(12=PCHHIN98 Percent Change in Median
Household Income 1989-1999     1.41 (.01)   .50
